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Summary 
This report reviews recent literature on monitoring Poverty Reduction Strategies. It discusses four 
challenging areas: institutional arrangements; the role of non-government organisations; implementation 
and intermediate output monitoring; and using results. The main findings are: 
 
• Severe capacity constraints are not sufficiently acknowledged. International agencies should be less 
ambitious about what can be achieved and in what time frame. 
• The “technical secretariats”, responsible for implementing monitoring, are of central importance. 
Their need for analytical skills is widely acknowledged, but expertise in data management, 
communication and marketing are also necessary. 
• Building cooperation between ministries and agencies responsible for producing data is proving 
difficult. Success often depends on the status, capabilities and personalities of key people, not on 
formal mandates and frameworks. 
• Unless countries have strong local monitoring systems, it is hard to see that building local PRS 
monitoring capacity should be an immediate priority, given the magnitude of this task. 
• There is often confusion about the role of civil society in government monitoring systems. It is 
important that all stakeholders are aware of the involvement offered and that sufficient thought is 
given to the capacity, information access and influence required for civil society to perform their role. 
• The “chains of causality” between policies and outcomes remain problematic. This leads to problems 
in identifying appropriate intermediate indicators. Given scarce resources, a focus on monitoring 
budget allocations – linked to a small set of basic provision indicators – may be a reasonable and 
realistic starting point. 
• Administrative data provide essential information, but often not of sufficient quality for PRS 
monitoring. It is worth exploring possibilities for combining them with other sources to generate 
“best estimates”. 
• Demand for PRS monitoring information, other than to meet donor requirements, is often very 
weak. Monitoring systems must include marketing and communication activities to build this 
demand. 
 
Keywords: PRSPs, monitoring, evaluation, participatory processes, poverty assessments, institutional 
reform, decentralisation, poverty indicators. 
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Executive summary 
A review of recent documents on poverty reduction strategies (PRS) monitoring indicates that in most of 
the PRS countries there are severe capacity constraints across the range of skills required and suggests that 
those constraints are usually not sufficiently acknowledged or acted upon. They should imply the adoption 
of a less ambitious attitude as to what can be achieved and a willingness to make hard choices in 
prioritising activities. Success or failure will often be dependent on the capabilities, status and personalities 
of a few key players. 
Some argue that locating PRS monitoring under the ministry of finance can provide the necessary 
incentives to carry other actors along. However, the “virtual” monitoring system set out in the PRS Papers 
(PRSP) does not necessarily indicate the real power relationships between the various departments and 
personalities involved. It is probably more useful to seek to promote reasonable working relationships 
between the PRS monitoring committee and the ministries, local governments, agencies, etc. that are 
meant to provide information. A good working principle would be that the burdens imposed on marginal 
stakeholders – those with little real incentive to cooperate – should be minimised. 
PRSP preparation may have generated an interest in monitoring systems and data within government, 
but this interest does not typically extend to the detailed activities required to effectively implement those 
systems. The PRS “technical secretariat”, which it is to be hoped can take on these tasks, is therefore of 
central importance. There is much emphasis in the documentation on the need for analytical skills within 
these units. It would be more useful to assess capacity by relating staffing requirements to the specific 
tasks to be undertaken. Monitoring institutions also need sufficient staff to undertake the more mundane 
and routine activities which are an essential requirement of an effective monitoring system, and expertise 
in communication and advocacy to promote the use of the information produced. In most countries 
specialised analytical and policy review skills may be better contracted-in, especially if they address sector-
specific issues. 
Many of the PRS countries are committed to decentralisation policies that imply a need for local 
monitoring systems. However, this does not imply that national PRS monitoring should necessarily be 
predicated on such systems. In many countries the capacity constraints which apply at national level are of 
a higher order of magnitude at local level and will take many years to remedy. As and when they are 
functioning effectively they will undoubtedly contribute to PRS monitoring and those responsible for the 
national system should obviously collaborate and provide support to the extent practicable. However, 
building local capacity throughout the nation should not necessarily be seen as a priority for those 
responsible for PRS monitoring, given the magnitude of this task and their overall financial, human 
resource and time constraints. Moreover, particularly where there is popular support for decentralisation, 
local monitoring systems are more likely to function well if they are seen as evolving in response to a 
genuine local demand for the information produced, rather than as data-collection outposts of a central 
agency. 
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Even if government priorities are expressed in the PRSP, these may not be owned by sectoral 
ministries or other agencies, which will typically have their own agendas and priorities. Sharing and 
combining information is not usually part of the culture of such institutions. The cautious approach would 
be to assume that, though there may well be scope for joint activities, for example on PRS and sectoral 
monitoring, ministries will generally regard the former as primarily a source of additional demands with no 
obvious benefits. As suggested above, if this position is adopted, the aim would then be to make such 
demands as minimal as possible. Alternatively, it could be reasonably argued that PRS monitoring might 
provide an opportunity for improving the present situation which is clearly unsatisfactory. There would 
clearly be considerable advantages if existing government monitoring systems could be gradually enhanced 
and coordinated so that the requirements of PRS monitoring could be met without the creation of a 
separate dedicated agency. The National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (NIMES) 
initiative in Uganda should provide evidence of the potential value of this strategy. 
Civil society involvement in PRS monitoring should have a number of benefits. If effective it can 
indeed increase the input and agency of civil society organisations (CSOs) and improve the transparency 
and accountability of government actions. However, all sides must be aware what form of involvement is 
being offered. Does “participation” involve some degree of empowerment and control over outcomes or 
is it simply another word for informing CSOs about what government intends to do? Both may be useful 
activities but they should not be confused. 
It is by no means self-evident that CSOs should always seek to be involved in joint monitoring 
activities, particularly if that involvement is heavily dependent on government funding. It can be argued 
that at least some would be much better occupied in the independent analysis of monitoring data, so that 
they can be in a position to seriously debate the interpretation of findings with central and local 
government agencies. However, the ability of CSOs to play such a role will depend on their internal 
capacity in terms of analysis and exposition, the extent to which official sources of information are made 
available to them in a timely fashion and their access to effective channels of communication and 
influence. 
There is currently much discussion of the need for “missing middle” indicators relating to policy 
implementation. However, it must be remembered that the lack of such indicators in early PRSPs was not 
a simple oversight. The emphasis on outcomes and impacts reflected a reasonable desire for evidence that 
policies were resulting in actual as opposed to potential improvements in the living standards of the poor. 
In many cases the precise chains of causality between policies and outcomes were, and remain, 
problematic and open to debate. Such uncertainty makes the selection of relevant indicators problematic. 
Moreover, even if optimal indicators (i.e. most appropriate given a clear understanding as to how a given 
policy initiative is intended to produce a desired outcome) can be defined, they may well prove difficult or 
expensive to estimate to the required level of precision (i.e. such that substantive change is sufficiently 
larger than measurement error) over the timescale required. 
Given scarce resources, a focus on budget allocations and expenditures may well be an appropriate 
response, particularly if it involves effective tracking exercises with mechanisms to ensure transparency 
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and accountability. This is a similar route to that proposed in the Kenya Interim Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (IPRSP) (discussed in Booth and Lucas 2001). Linking these data to a small set of basic 
service provision indicators that can reliably reflect annual changes could provide a reasonable starting 
point in assessing if a PRS is on track. 
Routine data systems have the great potential advantage that they can deliver geographically 
disaggregated information. To the extent that decentralised decision-making and policy implementation is 
effectively implemented, they could be more useful than survey estimates if quality problems could be 
overcome. However, that remains a daunting and at least medium-term task. One question which is rarely 
addressed is whether the poor quality could be ameliorated at least in the short run by analytical means. It 
would seem useful to explore further the possibilities for combining routine data with other sources to 
generate best estimates. 
The preference of donors for survey-based data is understandable and may be perfectly rational in 
the short term. Surveys are typically the only source of data that can be readily disaggregated by 
population socio-economic characteristics. They can be used to enhance the value of routine data systems, 
for example, by demonstrating the links between geographical and socio-economic factors as in poverty 
mapping. However, the adoption of standardised survey packages for PRS monitoring should be carefully 
examined. Many surveys originated in a research context and their content may not be optimal for the 
uses to which they are now being put. An interesting question would be: “What are the minimum data 
required from such surveys to provide the necessary evidence on PRS implementation issues in a given 
country?” 
Donors are often reluctant to become involved in potentially long-drawn-out, hostile and often 
unproductive debates on the reliability of indicators. The approach adopted by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), of requiring that at least the quality of key indicators be openly 
assessed and alternative methods of improving quality proposed where necessary, is an interesting model. 
It would be helpful if the distinction between “qualitative methods” and “participation” were more 
clearly maintained. The routine labelling of qualitative exercises as “participatory”, which often seems to 
be done in order to emphasise agencies’ concern with community involvement and “ownership”, may be 
becoming counter-productive. A useful and workable distinction might be to encourage the use of the 
word participation only for monitoring activities which are independent of government or donor agency 
control. 
With some notable exceptions (for example, Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania and Vietnam), at least 
in the short run there will probably be limited demand for PRS monitoring data, other than that generated 
by the need to meet the requirements of donor review processes. Few PRS countries have traditionally 
used performance monitoring to drive policy change or budget allocation decisions. PRS monitoring 
agencies will need to have very good marketing and communications skills if they are to persuade 
government officials and civil society of the value to them of the information being produced. Targeting 
findings to meet the specific interests of sectoral ministries, local government, CSOs and other 
stakeholders is essential. Two specific approaches seem to have made some headway: governments 
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(national and local) and CSOs do appear sensitive to indicators which show their position relative to other 
countries, provinces, districts, etc.; and poverty mapping seems to have a similar potential to provoke 
responses that may influence policy debates. 
Some existing poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) exercises provide attractive examples of the 
type of policy analysis process which might engender a greater interest in the use of PRS data, if it became 
part of the routine activities of the monitoring system. Given capacity constraints, it may be necessary to 
base such activities initially within the technical secretariat, possibly reinforced by local or international 
consultants. However, extending the basic approach to involve CSOs would be an attractive possibility. 
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1  Introduction 
The overall objective of this study was to assess, mainly using available documentation but also by 
discussion with a limited number of individuals closely involved with the process, some of the key 
practical issues arising from experience with the implementation of PRS monitoring systems. 
As a first step the study reviewed recent available materials on Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) 
monitoring from sources other than the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID). Given the volume of documentation on this subject 
which originates from these agencies, this restriction was intended to extend the range of sources 
considered. The review therefore focused on other donors, international agencies, developing country 
official publications, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and academic journals. The restriction has 
not been followed absolutely. A substantial amount of interesting material arises from consultancies, 
workshops, presentations, etc. which have either been to some extent organised or funded by the World 
Bank or DFID or involved their representatives. In addition, some factual materials which seemed helpful 
to the discussion and were known to be readily available from the World Bank Poverty Reduction 
Strategies Papers (World Bank PRSP) website were referenced. 
It may be interesting to note that the general avoidance of World Bank, IMF and, to a lesser extent, 
DFID materials proved more difficult than expected. Much of the easily available material on the websites 
of other donor agencies tended to discuss PRS monitoring in the context of a broader discussion of PRS 
issues and often in very general terms – for example, stressing the need for better data, capacity building 
or community involvement – rather than dealing with the specific experiences or technical issues with 
which this review was primarily concerned. Much of it was also responsive to World Bank initiatives or 
activities, rather than proactive in proposing new approaches or methods. A substantial proportion of the 
(often critical) NGO material was also responsive, though it did frequently propose alternative, typically 
community-oriented, monitoring approaches. Searches of the academic literature proved disappointing. 
Given the lead time required for journal publication, the limited number of articles available on 
monitoring tended to relate to the earliest round of PRSPs and thus considered only the initial small group 
of sub-Saharan African countries. As might be expected, this bias was reflected to a lesser extent in all of 
the sources. 
Some of the more interesting material gathered by the above process is contained in Annex 2. Here, 
the main aims will be to: (a) provide a brief outline of the issues raised by the review; (b) indicate the 
various positions taken up in the documentary materials; and (c) suggest possible approaches to 
determining best practice within a given context. For the purposes of this last and most important 
objective the limitation on sources mentioned above will obviously be disregarded. For simplicity, the 
report is structured under four main headings: 
 
• Who monitors? Institutional arrangements and monitoring capacity 
• The roles of NGOs 
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• The “missing middle” – monitoring implementation and intermediate outputs 
• Using the results – dissemination, analysis and policy change. 
 
This structure has been adopted in order to focus attention on specific issues raised by PRS monitoring, as 
distinct from more general concerns with the collection, analysis, dissemination and use of policy relevant 
data in PRS countries. The first section will review the various arrangements adopted to implement PRS 
monitoring. This will consider which department or agency is allocated primary responsibility, the 
arguments for and against decentralised monitoring, and the links with sector-specific information 
systems. The second will focus on the roles played by NGOs, either inside formal institutions or 
independently, with particular reference to the role of national parliaments. The third section will examine 
the area which has increasingly come to be seen as the key weakness in PRS monitoring systems: the 
difficulties of providing short-term (at least annual) estimates of progress in programme implementation 
and intermediate outputs. This section will focus on issues arising from the use of three primary sources 
of data: routine data systems, rapid surveys/studies and qualitative/participatory methods. It will also 
address a related concern, that of providing such data at the required level of disaggregation, both 
geographically and by population sub-group. Finally, the fourth section will review the extent to which 
PRS monitoring data is analysed, disseminated and used to influence policy. 
Where possible, the discussion will be informed by reference to tables derived from the relevant 
sections on monitoring taken from the 34 PRSPs currently available on the World Bank PRSP website. 
These tables are given in Annex 1. 
 
2  Who monitors? Institutional frameworks and monitoring capacity 
This section focuses on the institutional arrangements established for PRS monitoring. As expressed in a 
recent evaluation of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) support for the PRSP process, 
this activity: ‘requires effective institutional structure and appropriate capacity as well as strong grounding 
in different techniques and methodologies’ (UNDP 2003a). The essential question is whether the 
institutions given responsibility really have the capacity to undertake the various tasks involved. The word 
capacity is here used in the broad sense, to include not only issues of technical expertise, but also the 
equally important aspects of leadership, appropriate allocation of responsibilities and resources, and 
effective work and management practices including incentives (Orbach 2003). 
In a number of respects PRS monitoring presents an original and daunting challenge. Many of the 
earlier poverty monitoring exercises, including those undertaken to provide an input to PRS design, 
focused on the compilation of existing output/outcome indicators. In many respects they involved 
activities similar to those undertaken to produce the annual volumes of statistics published in many 
countries. They were often based primarily on the existing findings of integrated household surveys, 
participatory poverty assessments (Brock, Cornwall and Gaventa 2001) and information provided by the 
routine data systems of sectoral ministries. PRS monitoring also involves the use of information from a 
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variety of sources, typically including routine data from at least four ministries (finance, education, health 
and agriculture), one or more household surveys and a number of special studies, often involving 
qualitative or participatory methods. However, the demands made on those responsible for the estimation 
of PRS indicators from these sources differ in at least four important respects. 
First, whereas a poverty status report usually combines the most recent estimates available for the 
various sources, which may well span a number of years, all the information in a PRS monitoring report 
should obviously relate to the specific time period over which assessment of progress is being made. 
Second, information has to be provided on progress in both short-term poverty reduction and PRS 
implementation. These two factors taken together entail a move away from a preoccupation with final 
outcome indicators, which predominate in poverty monitoring, to include many more input and 
intermediate output indicators. Third, those taking responsibility for monitoring have a much greater 
“burden of proof”. They have to be convinced, and to convince others (including a possibly sceptical 
donor audience), that the information available from each source meets an adequate standard of reliability 
and sensitivity such that it can be used to assess what may well be relatively limited changes in PRS 
indicators over the course of a single year. Fourth, the presentation of the findings, for example at an 
annual review meeting, has potentially serious consequences. At the very least, progress will be applauded 
and lack of progress questioned. At worst, insufficient progress from a donor perspective may be linked to 
a decision not to provide a further tranche of funding. 
Two interrelated strategies, which might be characterised as “political” and “technical”, have 
generally been adopted to address these issues. The first stresses the need for monitoring to be a “high-
status” activity. Senior politicians and government officials have to be seen to actively support the 
monitoring process and lend authority, typically by their presence on a high-level oversight committee 
(which we will refer to as the PRS monitoring committee), to the demands made on ministries and 
agencies that are required to provide the necessary timely, reliable information. The second focuses on the 
need for the identification or creation of a specialised technical unit or secretariat (here called the technical 
secretariat), which has the capacity both to provide the expertise needed to implement the monitoring 
process and to provide assistance to contributing agencies where required. Donor support to monitoring 
has tended to focus on three related areas: the activities of the high-level committee, which often includes 
donor representatives; the provision of financial and/or technical assistance to the secretariat; and similar 
support to ministries, statistics departments and NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) for 
relevant specific surveys or studies. 
 
2.1 The PRS monitoring committee 
The high-level committee is typically allocated primary responsibility for coordinating the efforts of other 
monitoring units, for example the national statistical office or relevant departments in line ministries, and 
preparation of the annual PRS implementation reports. In many sub-Saharan countries (e.g. Kenya, 
Mozambique and The Gambia) the key player tends to be the ministry of finance, on the reasonable basis 
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that poverty reduction activities have to be intimately linked to overall resource allocation decisions. In the 
Asian countries, on the other hand, initial indications are that ministries of planning will take the leading 
role (e.g. Vietnam, Bangladesh and Nepal). This may simply reflect the relatively higher status of planning 
ministries in these countries (though this approach does not seem to have been followed in the former 
Soviet Union (FSU) countries) but would be of concern if it also relates to a view that the PRS is 
‘primarily about (donor) investment expenditure rather than (government) recurrent expenditure’ as 
suggested by an Overseas Development Institute document (ODI 2003b) on PRS monitoring in Asia. 
A PRSP consultants workshop report (ODI 2002a) makes the interesting point that the lead role 
taken by ministries of finance in sub-Saharan Africa represents a major institutional change. Traditionally, 
monitoring systems in these countries have also been located within that branch of government 
responsible for development planning, either in a planning ministry or in related units in line ministries. 
The report argues that the officials in such units are accustomed to a technical and bureaucratic approach 
to monitoring appropriate for the implementation of (often donor-funded) projects and that the shift to a 
more ‘strategic and learning-oriented’ approach required for PRS monitoring may well be seen as a 
challenge to their professional skills and a threat to their existing status. This feeling may be reinforced by 
the perception that overall control has shifted to the ministry which oversees their budget. 
Tanzania provides an interesting case study in that considerable efforts were made to seek wide 
agreement, both within and beyond government, on the design and implementation of the PRS 
monitoring system (Annex 2 Note 1). Evans and van Diesen (2002) are generally impressed by this 
attempt to broaden involvement: 
 
There have been criticisms of the institutional framework, with some arguing that it is unnecessarily 
complicated and cumbersome in a way that is typical of compromise solutions. Yet there is a strong 
feeling particularly amongst Government stakeholders that this is a workable framework that makes 
appropriate use of the existing capacity and mandate of various organisations. 
(Evans and van Diesen 2002) 
 
However, there are concerns that sharing responsibility between different agencies may lead to a lack of 
clarity as to who does what. In a consultancy report for the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC) on support to the PRSP in Burkina Faso, Gerster and Sawadogo (2003) comment on: 
 
parallel structures at the central level with very limited effectiveness and efficiency. Confusion 
prevails in the sense of very different interpretations of the tasks of sector groups, high transaction 
costs of meetings and heterogenity of participants. NGOs consider it as a heavy and opaque follow-
up mechanism, duplicating the ordinary established channels instead of empowering them. Some 
donors qualify the follow-up set-up bluntly as “dysfunctional”. Moreover, since mid-2002, the 
implementation is overshadowed by the rivalry between the two key Ministries in charge of PRSP. 
(Gerster and Sawadogo 2003) 
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Similarly, a report on the PRS monitoring framework for Pakistan (ODI 2002b) points out the potential 
for confusion and duplication of effort between the Planning Commission, supported by the Centre for 
Research on Poverty Reduction and Income Distribution, and the PRSP secretariat, based in the Ministry 
of Finance, both of which were at one stage independently undertaking design work on the PRS 
monitoring framework. More recently, this situation seems to have lead to the circulation of apparently 
contradictory poverty monitoring indicators (personal communication 2004). The World Bank Operations 
Evaluations Department (Hauge 2001) raised similar concerns with reference to the Uganda Poverty 
Eradication Plan (PEAP) PRSP, noting the rigid separation of resource monitoring and poverty 
monitoring systems, though both are coordinated within the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development. 
 
2.2 The technical secretariat 
The consultancy report on Pakistan (ODI 2002b) also stresses the need for an effective technical 
secretariat. It argues that it is 
 
necessary to identify a single, competent, institution which can and will assume responsibility for 
(i) identifying the ongoing data needs for PRSP monitoring; (ii) allocating the necessary funding; and 
(iii) ensuring that the information is collected, is sufficiently reliable, and is made available for PRSP 
monitoring purposes on a timely basis and in a useful format. 
(ODI 2002b) 
 
The Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit (PMAU) in Uganda, which has been supported by DFID, is 
perhaps the best known example of such a unit and appears to be generally well regarded. PRSP Synthesis 
Note 7 (ODI 2003a) notes a consultancy report which claims that it ‘has operated very effectively as the 
linchpin on which the whole poverty monitoring effort depends’. The UNDP has similarly offered 
financial and technical support to the establishment of such units in a number of countries including 
Azerbaijan, Mali, The Gambia and Vietnam (UNDP 2003b). In terms of capacity, their main concern 
appears to be that this unit should have adequate staff with skills and experience in data analysis, 
interpretation and dissemination. In Azerbaijan, for example: 
 
In response to a need identified by the government in the PRSP, UNDP and other members of the 
UNCT have offered to support the establishment of a Poverty Monitoring Unit within the PRSP 
Secretariat. Staff of the unit will be trained to use various surveys and other sources of information 
and, in turn, will train and support members of other government bodies . . . In this way, poverty 
monitoring efforts will have a much larger impact on the development of effective poor-poor 
policies. 
(UNDP 2003b) 
 
6 
This emphasis on analytical skills, or lack of them, is widespread in the documentation and, while often 
taken as self-evident, may require closer examination. As will be argued below, such skills are certainly not 
the only requirement for effectiveness. 
 
2.3 Centralised versus decentralised systems 
PRS monitoring systems tend to be established at the national level. However, in many countries, 
government policy includes a commitment to decentralisation, at least for service delivery, and it is argued 
that in such cases the PRS process should support the development of a capacity for data collection and 
analysis at lower administrative levels. In Tajikistan, for example, a Presidential decree has ordered the 
establishment of poverty monitoring systems at regional and local level (personal communication). Asche 
(2003) suggests three possible reasons why decentralised monitoring might be considered appropriate: 
(1) it is regarded as having the potential to deliver findings of a higher technical quality; (2) in order to 
support administrative decentralisation; or (3) to allow an effective ‘division of labour’ between 
collaborating donor agencies. While not dismissing any of these as necessarily invalid, he argues that the 
claimed benefits are often overstated. For example, central agencies are often perfectly capable of 
determining regional variations in poverty and there is little evidence that decentralised monitoring does in 
fact promote effective decentralisation. Asche suggests that only where decentralisation is already well 
established does the need for location-specific information provide a rational basis for decentralised 
monitoring systems. 
Such an approach was adopted in Tanzania. The Poverty Monitoring Master Plan (Tanzania 2001) 
sees local government authorities (LGAs) as ‘the obvious place for coordination’ of routine data. The 
Local Government Reform Programme was intended to promote the development of a monitoring and 
evaluation system that ‘makes information available that is important to local decision makers’. The Local 
Government Monitoring and Evaluation System was originally intended to be fully operational in 2004, at 
which point it was to become the ‘key source for poverty monitoring indicators’. Improvements in 
existing routine data systems were to be undertaken in order to meet demand until the new system was 
fully established. There are indications that this may take somewhat longer than planned (Evans and van 
Diesen 2002). 
The consultancy report on Pakistan (ODI 2002b) suggests that decentralised monitoring can have an 
important role, if certain conditions are met. It argues that ‘PRSP monitoring frameworks are intrinsically 
“top down” in nature, that is designed to enable federal or provincial governments to monitor progress 
within provinces or districts under their jurisdiction’. However, if decentralisation is taken seriously and 
those districts are made responsible for PRS implementation in their local area, this should clearly be 
guided by appropriate and reliable monitoring data. The report suggests that national sample surveys, 
because of limitations on sample size, are unlikely to provide such data. Reliance will have to be placed on 
administrative sources or on local data collection exercises, with a greater or lesser degree of community 
involvement. The quality of this data is seen as largely dependent on the perceived incentives. Good data 
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may be produced by local governments if they feel under pressure to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
service delivery and by community groups if they feel that the issues they raise will feed into policy 
decisions. The report suggests that if these conditions can be met ‘local level monitoring represents a great 
opportunity’. 
The consultants workshop report (ODI 2002a) referred to above takes a more sceptical view, at least 
of the extent to which scarce resources should be allocated to supporting local monitoring arrangements: 
 
While the idea of monitoring as closely as possible to the ground is always appealing, and local 
planning needs of course to be as well informed as possible, the cost, relevance and level of demand 
need to be taken into account before any initiatives at this level are attempted. There was a general 
feeling among the consultants that the rather centralised nature of current PRS monitoring efforts is 
appropriate right now. 
 
2.4 Sector specific versus cross-sector systems 
A substantial report commissioned by KfW considers the relationship between sector programmes and 
PRSP implementation (Hasselbarth 2001). This recognises potential risks if PRS monitoring agencies are 
seen simply as imposing additional data requirements and introducing increased complexity into existing 
sectoral monitoring arrangements. However, it also sees a potential for complementarities and mutual 
gains: 
 
if a coherent overall set of indicators and monitoring system can be ensured, the increased 
complexity on the one hand should be compensated by the efficiency gains on the other hand. 
Therefore, the sectoral indicators should also be integrated into the PRSP and the indicators to be 
monitored have to be harmonized. Where the PRSP should concentrate on a number of core 
indicators, the sector programmes can focus on more in-depth and implementation-oriented 
indicators for the relevant sectors…the division of responsibilities for the collection of data and the 
forwarding to the institutions responsible for the analysis and monitoring has to be clearly defined. 
 
A review (CIDA 2002) of PRS monitoring arrangements in five countries (Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Mali and Niger) suggests that harmonisation between PRS and sector ministries will not be a 
simple process: 
 
the current conditions do not seem conducive to timely and satisfactory ownership of the monitoring 
function by the concerned civil society actors and governments. Indeed, when it comes to the 
governments, apart from some specific cases, the work methods are not yet adapted to the 
requirements of the PRS monitoring-evaluation. In fact, it seems that the sectoral ministries remain 
disinclined to reconsider their work methods from the vantage point of the priorities expressed in the  
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PRSs . . . the experience of shifting paradigms and national strategies over the past decades tends to 
elicit a degree of caution vis-à-vis the PRSP approach, which is perceived as new and which some still 
consider as another externally imposed initiative. 
(CIDA 2002) 
 
The consultancy workshop report discussed above (ODI 2002a) also considers the relationship between 
PRS monitoring systems and the routine data generated by sector ministries. It argues that the temptation 
to disregard such data and attempt to construct a new system ‘that monitors everything’ should be resisted, 
both because it will not be successful and because it risks antagonising those line-ministry officials whose 
support is most required. 
 
While line-ministry routine monitoring systems are often not functioning effectively, replacing them 
with a single unified centralised system is both impractical and inappropriate. Attempts to do this will 
only swamp central bodies with information they cannot handle. Less obviously, this approach also 
carries with it the risk of undermining what line-ministry commitment there may be to a PRS process. 
Often, line ministries already feel “worked around” rather than “worked with” in PRS processes. 
Encouraging the improvement of line-ministry monitoring systems – and then monitoring those – 
would be a better level of ambition for PRS monitoring…It does not exclude timely, cost-effective 
initiatives from the centre to complement or check up on the routine data that sectors agree to 
collect. 
(ODI 2002a) 
 
Encouraging sector ministries to improve their own internal monitoring arrangements, for example, by 
working with more disaggregated data and using service delivery surveys or Participatory Poverty 
Assessments (PPAs) to complement or validate routine data from local service providers, is seen as a 
more effective way to improving the quality of the overall PRS monitoring system. The potential for 
improving sector routine data systems will be considered further below. 
An important recent development which considers both cross-sectoral and decentralised information 
systems is currently being developed in Uganda. The National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation 
Strategy (NIMES) (Uganda 2004a) has the aim of establishing an institutional framework ‘to bring greater 
coordination to M&E [monitoring and evaluation] initiatives in Uganda’ by providing mechanisms that 
align them to the stated needs of key stakeholders. Essentially, these mechanisms involve the creation of a 
series of formal committees on which representatives of agencies responsible for a wide range of 
information systems will meet on a regular and frequent basis to pursue a gradual process of 
harmonisation, rationalisation and enhancement aimed at increasing their combined value for evidence-
based policy-making. 
This process is intended to take place across both sectors and levels of government. For example, 
local education management information system (EMIS) data should be explicitly linked to national data 
on education collected by the Bureau of Statistics and, where relevant from a policy perspective, EMIS 
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concepts and definitions harmonised with those of the health management information system (HMIS). 
Two existing programmes, Uganda Info, a national indicators database managed by the Bureau of 
Statistics, and the LOGICS Management Information System (MIS), which is being developed by the 
Ministry of Local Government to enhance district level data, will be used by NIMES with the aim of 
ensuring that key stakeholders have access to required information from a wide range of existing M&E 
and MIS databases. 
PEAP monitoring, described in the document as ‘the most important cross-Government policy 
framework’, is the driving force behind the proposal. ‘Ensuring that the PEAP data and information needs 
are met will be an important focus’ and two key tasks of NIMES will be to ‘operationalize the M&E 
aspect of the PEAP matrix by matching the proposed indicators with specific M&E or MIS systems’ and 
‘ensure that accurate, reliable, timely estimates of the indicators are available’. Other cross-sectoral policy 
frameworks are to have access to NIMES and it is also seen as playing a major role in the definition of 
district level data needs. For the latter purpose, a specific District Data and Information Coordination 
committee is to be included. 
 
2.5 Government and donor monitoring procedures 
PRS monitoring has been seen by a number of agencies as a key activity in terms of determining 
ownership. The UNDP, for example, suggests that:  
 
There is a contradiction between the principle of national ownership of PRSPs and the fact that 
monitoring is seen as principally to report to external agencies. With its emphasis on nationally 
owned MDGs, the UNDP would be the logical agency to raise this anomaly and press for PRSP 
reports aimed at national audiences, which would secondarily be used as progress reports to donors 
and lenders. 
(UNDP 2003a) 
 
It emphasises the need for government ownership of the monitoring process in its consideration of 
involvement in the PRS for Azerbaijan. 
 
Many international organizations, concerned with government commitment to implement the PRSP 
strategy, thought UNDP should play an important role in monitoring implementation of the PRSP 
based on UNDP’s perceived neutrality. While there may be some benefit from independent 
monitoring, monitoring implementation is the responsibility of the government and should be 
undertaken in the context of annual (and possibly quarterly) progress reports. UNDP’s resources 
would be better used to support this. 
(UNDP 2003b) 
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Ownership was also the main issue at a meeting in 2002 of the Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) 
Task Team on the Post full-PRSP Process (SPA 2002). Their “Vision” of a PRS monitoring and reporting 
system emphasised the need for a unified system, owned by national governments, agreed with all donor 
agencies and based on an agreed minimal set of PRS indicators, reliably estimated from data generated by 
the national PRS monitoring system (Annex 2, Note 2). The meeting reached agreement that most of the 
outstanding problems related to a single issue – national monitoring systems were not sufficiently well 
developed (both in terms of capacity and the extent of civil society involvement) to gain the trust of 
donors. Hence there was a reluctance to abandon established and proven parallel systems. 
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) review described above clearly identifies 
this problem: 
 
Notwithstanding the existence of serious concerns relating to PRSP monitoring and the presence of 
dialogue platforms…implementation of monitoring-evaluation mechanisms is the subject of only a 
handful of very ad hoc initiatives on the part of certain donors. None of the countries in the study 
has an overall plan covering monitoring-evaluation capacity enhancement based on priorities 
established and recognized by the national authorities and all of the donors. Moreover, there are no 
mechanisms common to the donors for supporting these efforts. 
(CIDA 2002) 
 
More optimistically, the SPA Task Team meeting suggests that in some countries these issues were to 
some extent being addressed. It cites the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) in 
Mozambique, where ten donors had pooled budget support, agreed an accountability framework, and 
accepted government quarterly reports on financial execution of the joint donor programme, quarterly 
reports on budget execution and annual audit reports. Similarly, a recent World Bank/Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC)/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
meeting on harmonisation (World Bank and Secretariat of DAC/OECD 2003) comments favourably on 
the example of Bolivia, where four development cooperation agencies (those of Netherlands and Sweden, 
and the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank) had agreed with the government on a 
uniform monitoring system that included joint donor field visits and a uniform report to all donors. 
Again, in the SDC consultancy report on Burkina Faso, in spite of the complexity of the government 
institutional arrangements, considerable progress on harmonisation is reported: 
 
As a consequence of the joint budget support based on the PRSP, the state secretariat for economic 
affairs (seco) has reviewed and revised its procedures regarding the follow up and disbursement of 
budget support. These procedures are largely harmonised with the other donors of the budget 
support group. The Director General of the then Ministry of Economics and Finance is reported to  
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speak ‘warmly of the benefits of donor coordination, because the donors now receive the same 
monitoring and reporting documents’. In summer 2002, policy dialogue between participating 
bilateral donors and the Government also took place as a joint exercise for the first time. 
(Gerster and Sawadogo 2003) 
 
The European Community (EC), in an article on the Burkina Faso DCSLP (Cadre Stratégique de Lutte 
contre la Pauvreté – version of the PRSP) in the DAC Journal (OECD 2002), makes clear both its support 
for the principle of a unified monitoring and reporting process and its perception of the substantial 
difficulties involved in realising this ambition. 
 
Because of the weakness of Burkinabe statistics and difficulties in their tracking, much remains to be 
done before the EC and the DCSLP will have a meaningful results tracking systems. Nevertheless, 
the useful innovations that have been introduced to date represent an interesting point of departure 
(perhaps a first?) in addressing everyone’s need – from the Burkinabe citizen to the European 
Parliament – for a reliable DCSLP impact reporting system. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
Underlying much of the discussion around PRS monitoring systems are two key facts. The first is that in 
most of the countries involved there are severe capacity constraints across the range of skills required. The 
second is that these constraints are not sufficiently recognised or acted upon. They should imply the 
adoption of a very conservative attitude as to what can be achieved and a willingness to make hard choices 
in terms of prioritising activities. Success will often be dependent on the capabilities, status and 
personalities of a few key players. Does the nature of the institutional framework matter in this context? 
As indicated above, some argue that locating PRS monitoring under the Ministry of Finance greatly 
increases the likelihood that it will be linked to government expenditures and that this will provide the 
necessary incentives to carry other actors along. However, as suggested above, the “virtual” monitoring 
system set out in the PRSP almost certainly does not indicate the real power relationships between the 
various departments and personalities involved and these will typically be more important than any formal 
administrative arrangements. 
Rather than relying on the latter, it is probably more useful to seek to promote reasonable working 
relationships between the PRS monitoring committee and the ministries, local governments, agencies, etc. 
that are meant to provide the information on which it relies. The head of that committee clearly has to 
have sufficient status (or contacts) to request cooperation from senior counterparts but it is doubtful if 
either mandated authority or an implied threat to budgetary resources will provide the desired response. In 
general the best course of action may be to make the burden involved in providing data sufficiently light 
so that it is easier to comply than resist. A willingness to accept data in the form most easily provided 
rather than in the precise form required can contribute to this objective. 
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The preparation of PRSPs may have generated some interest in monitoring issues and data both in 
government and civil society, but to a great extent this appears to have been a general interest, for example 
in joining the process of identifying indicators and designing formal monitoring systems, rather than a 
practical interest in the detailed activities required to effective implement those systems, generate reliable 
estimates of indicators and use those indicators to explore policy issues and options. This implies that the 
PRS technical secretariat, which it is to be hoped can take on these tasks, is of central importance. 
As indicated above, there is much emphasis in the documentation on the need for analytical skills 
within the technical secretariat. There appears to be an assumption that those who are well qualified and 
experienced in data analysis are necessarily well equipped and motivated to pursue work on other equally 
important areas such as data quality assessment, data management and dissemination. In practice, it is 
often the case that many analysts regard these as less technically interesting activities to which they are not 
prepared to devote a great deal of time and effort. It would be far more useful to assess capacity by 
relating staffing requirements to the specific tasks to be undertaken. Such an assessment would, for 
example, consider if monitoring institutions have sufficient (possibly more junior) staff who have the 
necessary training, experience and incentives to undertake the more mundane and routine activities which 
are also an essential requirement of an effective monitoring system. It would also have to balance the need 
for high-level analytical skills against the expertise in communication and advocacy that is required to 
promote the use of the information produced. Where specialised analytical and policy review skills are 
required it may be better in many countries to contract-in the expertise required, especially if sector-
specific issues are to be addressed. 
In many PRS countries technical secretariats often have few, possibly just one or two, motivated and 
capable senior staff. Donors sometimes fund these staff members on salary scales which are substantially 
above those available within government. Withdrawal of donor funding will typically see those individuals 
seeking out other international agencies to maintain their income, probably disrupting the unit’s activities. 
Given the core role of the secretariat, it would be of considerable advantage if they had security of support 
over the PRS period and some degree of autonomy over staffing, salary, benefits and equipment issues. 
Many of the PRS countries are committed to decentralisation policies and, if these are taken 
seriously, they clearly necessitate the development of local monitoring systems that can provide the 
information required for local decision-making. However, this does not imply that national PRS 
monitoring should necessarily be predicated on such systems. In many countries the capacity constraints 
which apply at national level are of a higher order of magnitude at local level and will take many years to 
remedy. As and when they are functioning effectively they will undoubtedly contribute to PRS monitoring 
and those responsible for the national system should obviously collaborate and provide support to the 
extent practicable. For example, the establishment of reliable electronic communications between national 
and local monitoring systems would be of advantage to both. However, in terms of overall PRS 
monitoring resource allocation it is hard to see that building local capacity throughout the nation should 
be seen as an immediate priority, given the magnitude of this task and overall financial, human resource 
and time constraints. Moreover, particularly where there is popular support for decentralisation, local 
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monitoring systems are more likely to function well if they are seen as evolving in response to a genuine 
local demand for the information produced rather than as data-collection outposts of a central agency. 
Even if government priorities are expressed in the PRSP, these may not be owned by sectoral 
ministries or other agencies (including the statistics office), which will typically have agendas of their own. 
In general, sharing and combining information is not usually part of the culture of such institutions. Given 
this position, two possible strategies might be adopted. The cautious approach would be to assume that, 
though there may well be scope for joint activities on PRS and sectoral monitoring, ministries will 
generally regard the former as primarily a source of additional demands with no obvious benefits. As 
suggested above, if this position is adopted, the aim would then be to make such demands as minimal as 
possible. 
Alternatively, it could be reasonably argued that PRS monitoring might provide an opportunity to 
change this situation for the better. There would clearly be considerable advantages if existing government 
monitoring systems could be gradually enhanced and coordinated so that the requirements of PRS 
monitoring could be met without the creation of a separate dedicated agency.1 If existing monitoring 
institutions felt themselves to be full partners in such an initiative and were perhaps provided with some 
additional resources in return for their involvement, concerns relating to the costs of such involvement 
and the lack of relevance to their specific interests could be minimised. Problems relating to “missing 
middle” indicators might also be reduced as such indicators are often central to the day-to-day activities of 
sectoral ministries and they would presumably be very interested in joint activities to enhance their 
reliability or timeliness. As indicated above, such an approach has been recently adopted in Uganda under 
the NIMES initiative. Though the report of a workshop on the proposal (Uganda 2004b) reveals some 
initial confusion as to the objectives (it was suggested that the name be changed to NMEF – National 
Monitoring and Evaluation Framework to avoid concerns that it involved the creation of a integrated 
system which would impose additional reporting requirements) there appears to have been a generally 
enthusiastic welcome for the underlying principles of the coordinating framework. It will clearly be some 
time before its effectiveness can be assessed. 
 
3  The roles of non-governmental organisations 
Participation is a central tenet of the PRSP process. Many agencies regard it as an essential mechanism for 
increasing national ownership and improving the efficiency of government policies. The engagement of 
civil society organisations (CSOs) and the participation of citizens in general in policy-making may have 
increased in most countries as a  response to  this principle,  but  there remains a lack  of clarity  about the 
                                                 
1  This section owes much to comments on an initial draft by Aline Coudouel of the Poverty Reduction Unit of 
the World Bank. 
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nature of their engagement and how it should be facilitated. Participation, at whatever stage from 
consultation to monitoring and evaluation, is too often viewed as consensual and apolitical. The risks and 
costs of participation have not been fully understood nor accounted for. 
 
The image evoked is of a transparent and rational process. People say what they think. Everyone 
gives their views and is heard. Everyone has a position on the policy under discussion. Working 
together in harmony, across enormous power differentials, solutions are found to which everyone 
can agree. 
(Lucas and Cornwall 2003) 
 
In the general context of encouraging “ownership” of PRSs, there has been a great deal of discussion 
around the need to engage a broad range of stakeholders in the monitoring process. This, it is argued, can: 
improve the quality of monitoring; raise awareness of the changes taking place; and allow communities to 
contribute to the implementation process, for example by identifying problems and proposing policy 
changes. In a review of 21 PRSPs, Schnell and Forster (2003) note that more than half explicitly mention 
qualitative or participatory poverty and impact assessments in the M&E chapter. Only one country not in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Albania, did so, though others (Nicaragua, Vietnam) did use PPAs to support the 
PRSP poverty analysis. 
The World Bank PRSP sourcebook specifically highlights the need for involvement beyond 
government in various aspects of monitoring and evaluation systems: 
 
nongovernmental actors – research institutions, civil society organizations, special-interest and 
advocacy groups, and others – have an important role to play in the design of the monitoring and 
evaluation system, in actually carrying out monitoring and evaluation activities, and in using the 
results. 
(Prennushi, Rubio and Subbarao 2001) 
 
Below we consider two possible approaches to playing that role, essentially inside or outside the 
institutionalised PRS monitoring system. 
 
3.1 An institutional role for civil society? 
Pain and Kirsch (2002) argue that control of the monitoring system by the ministry of finance or any 
other central agency of government, be it the Vice President’s Office in Tanzania or the National 
Economic Commission in Malawi, runs the risk that it will become, or be perceived to become, not only 
centralised but exclusive. They suggest that if the capacity of civil society agencies for involvement is 
careful assessed, and appropriate support provided, their active involvement: 
 
offers the opportunity for the production of independent analysis and inputs into the public debate 
concerning what works and what doesn’t. Further, if the understanding of joint monitoring is taken 
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seriously it can help to achieve the principles of ownership, partnership, and comprehensiveness 
better than any rhetorical government speech. In an extreme case this can help to promote citizen 
action based on their involvement and create a space for action to be taken at a political level as a 
direct response to the demands for action created by civil society. 
(Pain and Kirsch 2002) 
 
This concern for wider engagement is strongly endorsed by the UNDP, who argue that one area of 
comparative advantage for them lies in: 
 
strengthening independent monitoring and evaluation capacities that are in line with the broader 
approaches to participation and transparency. Such capacities have to reside in civil society so that an 
independent assessment of performance can be made and so that government departments and 
programmes can be held accountable to the goals set in the PRSP. 
(UNDP 2003a) 
 
UNDP view support to participatory assessments (UNDP 2001) as reflecting one aspect of their general 
policy of encouraging an increased involvement of CSOs and community-based groups in the overall 
PRSP process. Funding CSOs’ activities which contribute to the monitoring and evaluation of poverty 
reduction strategies is seen as complementary to funding their contribution to the formulation of those 
strategies. On the other hand, the consultants workshop report discussed above takes a very cautious and 
limited view of the potential role that NGOs and CSOs can play: 
 
There is a common expectation, particularly among donors, that NGOs and CSOs can and will carry 
out some sort of “community level monitoring” of the PRS. Here too a distinction needs to be made 
between intelligent use of tools like PPAs and participatory beneficiary assessments that can provide 
quick “symptomatic” feedback on the basis of a small sample or case study, and instituting a 
comprehensive system. The latter should be regarded as out of the question. Such proposals rest on a 
serious underestimation of the technical challenges of building systems that are rigorous, reach down 
to the community level and generate data that will be actually used. 
(ODI 2002a) 
 
Forster (2002) urges a need to be realistic about the extent to which “real” participatory monitoring is on 
offer. He broadly distinguishes three very different levels of involvement, all of which are sometimes 
described as participatory: the provision of monitoring information; sharing control over the content, 
process and results of an evaluation activity; and engaging in the identification or implementation of 
corrective actions. Asche (2003) highlights the importance of understanding the role and political 
implications of  the choice  of strategy,  as  ‘seemingly  innocent participatory  PRSP monitoring  can have 
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politically very different meanings’. In extreme cases, he suggests, the encouragement given to 
communities to become involved in PRS monitoring may be simply a way of diverting them from seeking 
effective political influence on the implementation process: 
 
In several PRSP countries we are observing a tendency that is supported unwillingly by part of the 
donor community and that in fact will ultimately lead to participatory monitoring replacing genuine 
social participation in the implementation of the national PRSP. Whilst PRSP writing is still seen as a 
broad, consultative process, participation actually stops with the paper being handed over to the 
government for implementation, and social forces only come into play again when monitoring of 
results begins. Participatory PRSP monitoring, in this case, actually stands in for institutionalized 
political participation. 
(Asche 2003) 
 
On the other hand, some forms of participatory monitoring can have the strategic and conscious aim of 
strengthening social consultation and control. It is important that all involved parties are clear about which 
of these options is being pursued. Some methodologies, for example CoImPact, which is favoured by 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), aim to go far beyond the levels of 
accountability normally encountered in industrialised countries, and can raise politically challenging 
questions. The implications, and the extent of government willingness to respond, must be taken seriously 
(Asche 2003). For example, most NGOs are convinced that, whatever the feedback from monitoring 
exercises, broad macroeconomic policy is not up for discussion. When the Honduran NGO Interforos 
withdrew from the PRSP process because it felt alternative approaches were being pushed aside, the 
government responded that its options were tightly constrained by prior agreements with the IMF (Panos 
2002). 
While most donors and governments support the concept of involving civil society in PRS 
monitoring, few have provided an effective institutional basis for their involvement. A recent World 
Health Organisation (WHO) review of 21 PRSPs found that in the formal descriptions of most 
monitoring systems: 
 
Nongovernmental organizations and academic institutions are mentioned as monitoring partners in 
just three countries: Zambia, Honduras and Albania. Some other PRSPs do mention activities 
designed to gather opinions from poor people as part of their PRSP monitoring. For example, 
Malawi conducts annual stakeholder workshops as well as broader district level surveys and Uganda 
will receive input from the Participatory Poverty Assessment Project. Ethiopia has also recognized a 
need for a PPA, and Guinea will ensure that qualitative data is included in all its surveys. 
Fundamentally, however, monitoring remains in the hands of government structures and institutions 
with little external assistance or input. 
(WHO 2004) 
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A report by Oxfam (2002) similarly argues that the monitoring sections of PRSPs mainly focus on 
technical information to be collected by governments themselves rather than looking to the engagement 
of citizens to generate the kind of flexible feedback that could inform and help shape policy over time. 
There are a number of institutional arrangements by which civil society can potentially be involved: joint 
civil society and government initiatives; independent citizen monitoring; and citizen participation in 
government-led consultations (Forster 2002). Two interesting examples of alternative approaches are 
provided in Tanzania and Uganda (Annex 2 Note 3). 
Overall, with a limited number of interesting exceptions, PRS monitoring is very concentrated in 
government hands and ‘the terms of engagement…remain very much in the realm of the “invited 
participation” and “consultation”, where more powerful actors frame the way the others are involved’ 
(Brock 2000: 18). According to the categories of participation in PRSP processes identified by McGee 
(with Norton 2000), there is little evidence of real empowerment (initiation and control by stakeholders), 
but perhaps evidence of some gradual movement from consultation towards joint decision-making (Pain 
and Kirsch 2002). 
 
3.2 Independent civil society monitoring 
Some international NGOs have argued that developing independent monitoring initiatives may give civil 
society the chance to take more control over the process than engaging with government (Oxfam 2002: 
11). Thus far, the great majority of participatory exercises appear to have developed as government-led 
initiatives backed by donors. The review by Schnell and Forster (2003) indicates that, of the 21 countries 
considered, only in Honduras did CSOs appear to have taken the lead in this area. 
Hughes (2002) questions whether CSOs can engage with government on an equal footing and 
without compromising their values and autonomy. Some CSOs are sceptical about government 
commitment to participatory processes, and fear that participation in government systems will 
compromise their credibility as a watchdog over state policy and actions (Gould and Ojanen 2003). In 
addition, it has been suggested that such independent systems can serve to complement government 
efforts. Whereas the latter tend to focus on quantitative methods and take a national perspective, civil 
society approaches will generally be more qualitative and locally focused. 
A paper by Seshamani (2003) attempts to provide a rationale for an independent monitoring system 
in Zambia. It notes that civil society perspectives on what constitutes successful implementation do not 
always coincide with those of government. For example, there has been strong dissatisfaction with the 
emphasis on economic indicators. CSOs are said to be interested in exploring and monitoring a much 
wider range of factors than those determined by government. There is a concern, too, that civil society 
would be permitted a very limited role in government monitoring – not sufficient to articulate all their 
needs and concerns. An appraisal of the Government of Zambia’s monitoring system noted that the roles 
of anyone outside of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning appeared to be merely ‘peripheral add 
ons’ (Republic of Zambia cited in Seshamani 2003). 
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Cornally (2003) reports a coalition of four CSOs who were dissatisfied with government monitoring 
proposals and have therefore drawn up a National Plan for Capacity Building and Consultations for the 
Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation of the PRSP in Honduras. The aim is to ensure an increased role 
of civil society and local governments in the implementation, follow-up and evaluation of PRSP policies, 
programmes and projects. Through five months of workshops, they aim to increase the level of 
understanding of PRSPs amongst CSOs and then set up thematic monitoring committees. They would 
then be able to lobby for the inclusion of CSO committees in the government PRS monitoring plan and 
propose new indicators. They will also help to facilitate improved communication between government, 
civil society and donors. Cornally’s report (2003) notes high levels of interest but very weak capacity 
among NGOs. There are also high levels of concern about the political will of the government to facilitate 
civil society monitoring of the PRSP and to adapt the implementation of the strategy according to the 
results of the monitoring carried out. 
Whatever role they are to play, the capacity of CSOs to take up joint monitoring activities certainly 
needs to be addressed. In some countries there is a history of NGO capacity and civil society is well 
organised and networked. In others, however, the capacity needs are great. For example, civil society in 
Rwanda is described as ‘embryonic and unable to play even a timid role in holding the government 
accountable’ (Renard and Molenaers 2003). Most civil society and advocacy groups are small, voluntary 
and not well organised. In many African countries their social base is narrow and often urban, 
cosmopolitan and professional. In some cases domestic CSOs are “crowded out” of policy debates by 
better-resourced and more visible international NGOs. This is detailed by Gould and Ojanen (2003) in the 
case of Tanzania, where international NGOs have gained, often with substantial financial backing from 
donors, far more significant representation in the spaces for civil society involvement in the monitoring 
system than local CSOs, raising serious questions as to the true nature of “civil society”. 
Civil society relations with donors and the funding of capacity building are important factors. GTZ 
Social Policy Advisory Services (SPAS), in operation since 1999, provides an interesting example of 
support to NGOs in this area, more recently in relation to PRS monitoring. Funding for civil society 
implementation of monitoring plans is also a struggle, especially, though not exclusively, where these lie 
outside the government system. Poverty Action Funds (PAF) monitoring committees in Uganda are 
voluntary, but the related networking and training activities of the Uganda Debt Network (UDN) are 
funded from organisations such as Oxfam UK and the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA). In Tanzania, however, even those agencies involved in the PPA consortium working closely 
with government, have had to second a staff member at their own expense and were only compensated by 
government for field expenses. This clearly limits participation to those organisations which are financially 
secure (Gould and Ojanen 2003). 
Many Northern NGOs responded to requests for capacity support to local CSOs in PRSP 
consultation processes. However, while the need to shift the focus from poverty assessment to monitoring 
has been noted, practical assistance has, with some exceptions such as Oxfam’s support to the UDN, been  
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limited. Some national NGO networks have themselves undertaken programmes of skills development to 
build civil society capacity. In Uganda, the UDN has organised workshops which are said to have been 
well attended and attracted a number of district government officials (UDN 2002). 
 
3.3 The role of parliament 
In a study of the 28 sub-Saharan Africa countries involved in the PRS process, GTZ (2003) considers the 
actual and potential role of one particular group of stakeholders – national parliamentarians. They point 
out that: ‘Monitoring – controlling the actions of the executive – is one of the fundamental functions of 
parliament, and is also embedded in the constitutions of the African PRS countries studied’. However, 
they concede that effective oversight is rare, even in apparently straightforward areas such as the basic 
government accounts: ‘In only one fifth of the HIPC countries are the audited accounts submitted to 
parliaments within 12 months’. 
A few PRSPs (Guinea, Mauritania) explicitly indicate the need for parliamentary involvement in 
budget monitoring (Schnell and Forster 2003). However, Pain (2003) points out that there is no mention 
of a specific role for parliament in the PRS Sourcebook and argues that this is a neglected area that merits 
more attention. He suggests that in a truly democratic environment, parliament ‘should be responsible 
overall for the monitoring of the PRS’ and notes that the issue is of particular importance in countries 
such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Yemen, where parliament would expect to debate and approve the 
national plans. One encouraging development is said to be the emergence of a coalition between 
parliamentarians and civil society groups on issues relating to the PRS in a number of African countries. 
He cites the links between the Malawi Economic Justice Network (www.mejn.org) and the Parliamentary 
Committee on Budget and Finance. 
The Chair of that committee, L.J. Chimango, M.P., has described the difficulties of the task facing 
parliamentary committees in attempting to play an effective role in monitoring the Malawi PRS 
(Chimango 2002). He argues that substantial capacity building will be required in leadership development, 
training and support staff: 
 
A basic level of understanding of economic parameters is necessary for effectiveness in poverty 
reduction. Skills to access information are also necessary in the fast moving world of Internet. 
Minimum working facilities and an environment with capacity to follow up on issues is also 
critical…The Malawi experience also reveals that for the committees to succeed, well-motivated and 
trained clerks and research staff must service committees. Consulting services are expensive. 
Therefore, the sustainability of the Committees’ efforts lies in the recruitment of highly professional 
staff, hopefully those who will sympathise with the Committees’ zeal and mission. All too often, a 
committee’s enthusiasm can founder because of lack of support from Parliament staff. 
(Chimango 2002) 
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Mozambique has also legislated to provide a specific role for parliament in monitoring the PRS (PARPA). 
Responsibility is divided between three existing committees, which have the authority to summon 
ministers to report on progress (ODI 2003a). 
 
3.4 Discussion 
In principle, civil society involvement in PRS monitoring should have a number of benefits. If effective it 
can indeed increase the input and agency of CSOs and improve the transparency and accountability of 
government actions through increasing public awareness and understanding. However, as indicated above, 
all sides must be aware what form of involvement is being offered. Does “participation” involve some 
degree of empowerment and control over outcomes or is it simply another word for informing CSOs 
about what government intends to do. Both may be useful activities but they should not be confused. 
It is by no means self-evident that CSOs should always be involved in joint monitoring activities, 
particularly if that involvement is heavily dependent on government funding. It can be argued that at least 
some would be much better occupied in the independent analysis of monitoring data, so that they are in a 
position to seriously debate the interpretation of findings with central and local government agencies. This 
of course presupposes that governments are willing to accept this option and make required information 
available in a timely fashion and appropriate form. It will also depend on the capacity of CSOs in terms of 
analysis and exposition and their access to effective channels of communication and influence. These are 
areas where external support, for example from international NGOs, may well be required, again assuming 
government approval. The establishment of some form of mediating agency for quality assurance may also 
be helpful in ensuring that CSO “evidence” is sufficiently convincing to persuade government agencies 
that it is necessary to take it into account. The independent poverty observatories in West Africa seem an 
interesting model. 
The Bolivian example discussed in section 4.3.1 seems of particular interest, because of the legal 
framework which has been created in the National Dialogue and Popular Participation Laws. The Comites 
de Vigilancia, composed of six elected CBO leaders, are intended to ensure that community project 
priorities are reflected in local investment decisions. In principle they have the right to insist on audits and 
can petition for funds to be frozen if they suspect serious misuse. Of course, establishing such 
arrangements does not imply that they will function as intended and local power relations may well have 
much greater influence than national laws. 
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4  The “missing middle”: monitoring implementation and intermediate 
outputs 
Ideally, PRS monitoring should allow assessment of the extent to which identified policy actions have a 
positive impact on targeted populations. This requires that all the links in the chain between policy and 
impact should in principle be determined and quantified. Monitoring must therefore be concerned with 
inputs, proximate (intermediate) outputs, outcomes and final impacts. 
Booth and Lucas (2004) are among a number of authors to focus on the failure to address this 
requirement in early PRSPs, which generally focused on the relatively easier tasks of budgetary or 
expenditure analysis at one end of the chain and survey-based impact evaluation at the other. This failure 
has come to be known as one instance of the general problem of the “missing middle” – the need to 
specify more precisely how well-intentioned policies will deliver promised outcomes and impacts. It is of 
considerable concern because intermediate output indicators which can predict longer-term outcomes 
with reasonable reliability have come to be seen as central to the PRS implementation process. They are 
the only way to obtain short-term feedback on the practical consequences of policy actions and hence the 
possibility of modifying those which are not on track. 
However, the problems associated with the identification and estimation of such indicators should 
not be underestimated. DANIDA, in a review of the Tanzania PRSP (DANIDA 2001) points out that, for 
many of the suggested intermediate output indicators, short-term change will be at best small and difficult 
to monitor: ‘It might well be that a decade is a realistic time-frame for expecting new initiatives to have a 
profound impact on the chosen intermediate indicators’. The report argues that in some cases perhaps the 
best that can be realistically expected and effectively monitored in the short run is ‘the specification of 
budgetary targets for allocation of discretionary recurrent expenditure…to priority areas identified in the 
program’. Scott (2004), in a consultancy report on Honduras, also emphasises the long-term nature of the 
process of developing monitoring indicators. He suggests a useful distinction between ‘first and second 
generation’ indicators, moving gradually from the initial necessity to begin with indicators which may be 
‘deficient with respect to definition, coverage, accuracy, frequency of data collection or timeliness of 
dissemination’ to improved versions over a time horizon of three to five years. 
A WHO review of 21 PRSPs (WHO 2004) seems to confirms that, in spite of widespread agreement 
on the need to improve the situation, the “missing middle” problem is still very much in evidence, at least 
in monitoring PRS initiatives in the health sector. This review found that while impact indicators such as 
maternal and infant mortality were routinely targeted in monitoring systems, intermediate health 
indicators, other than that of simple coverage by health services, were much less well represented: 
 
there were often glaring gaps where whole components of the health strategy lacked any means of 
monitoring. Most typically, these were components related to strengthening the quality of care, 
improving management, strengthening data collection, etc . . . One gap, which was fairly consistent 
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across PRSPs, was the failure to provide for monitoring of activities to reduce financial barriers to 
health care. Although 15 PRSPs addressed this issue, only three presented indicators that could be 
monitored. 
(WHO 2004) 
 
Three broad and potentially complementary strategies have been pursued to address these issues: 
improvement of the existing routine data systems (RDSs) commonly used by ministries to track 
intermediate indicators; the development of national surveys (with particular emphasis on “rapid” or 
“light” surveys) specifically intended to deliver data relevant to PRS implementation at least annually; and 
special studies (including qualitative/participatory exercises), which either replace or at least triangulate 
estimates from routine sources for specific localities. The following three sections will consider 
experiences with each of these options. 
Before proceeding it may be useful to note that the review found only one serious attempt to address 
the apparently central question: “How should decisions be made as to the most efficient allocation of 
resources across diverse PRS monitoring sources?” In an innovative study in Tanzania, Rommelmann, 
Setel, Hemed, Mponezya, Angeles and Boerma (2003) attempted a cost-effectiveness analysis of 11 
different sources of information on national level indictors identified in the Poverty Monitoring Master 
Plan, Health Sector Reform Programme and Local Government Reform Programme. They argue that: 
 
demand for information is increasing at all levels, yet resource allocation in information system 
investments has lacked an evidence base, a comparison of costs and outputs that might inform 
decisions. Resources have been and may continue to be relatively scarce for service-based M&E 
efforts within line ministries, as well as for an increasing number of alternatives such as continuous 
“stand-alone” information systems (e.g., demographic surveillance sites), and cycles of repeated 
surveys (e.g., DHS or household budget surveys) that are generally carried out by statistics bureaus. It 
is our hope that the comparative costs and results presented here may assist in any expansion or 
consolidation of information collection efforts undertaken in Tanzania, and that our methods might 
be built upon in other contexts. (Rommelmann et al. 2003) 
 
Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, they were forced to radically adjust their initial aims: 
 
While a formal analysis of the cost-effectiveness of information systems was our initial objective, it 
was not attempted. The primary reasons for electing not to conduct a formal analysis related to 
constraints of time and resource, and the complexity of operationalizing an appropriate effectiveness 
parameter that could be measured across systems. 
(Rommelmann et al. 2003) 
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4.1 Routine data systems 
This section is concerned with efforts to improve the completeness and reliability of relevant 
administrative reporting systems and data, including sectoral management information systems. Almost all 
PRSPs (28 of the 34 listed in Annex 1, Table A.4) indicate that the routine information systems associated 
with service delivery in at least the education and health sectors will be one of the key components in the 
estimation of intermediate output indicators. There are grounds for arguing that PRS monitoring systems 
should be based as far as possible on such systems. In most countries data scarcity is not a problem. The 
major (and mutually reinforcing) constraints on effective use relate to: its poor quality; the limited analysis, 
interpretation and dissemination undertaken; and lack of compatibility and coordination between the 
various sources. If these constraints could be overcome, the benefits in terms of the establishment of 
sustainable sources of quality information which could serve the needs of both service delivery systems 
and national policy would be considerable. 
Over recent years, there have been a number of innovative exercises – some involving 
computerisation and communications technology but others simply based on better management of 
information and human resources – which have attempted to achieve this objective. The issue to be 
considered here is to what extent these exercises have been successful and whether they suggest that 
further investment in this area is the most useful use of scarce resources in developing improved PRS 
monitoring systems. 
It is interesting to note that the difficulties in using routine data systems for monitoring purposes 
were little discussed in the initial round of PRSPs. For example, the section on monitoring strategy in the 
PRSP for Mozambique emphasises the central role of such sources: 
 
with regard to process indicators, the strategy is based on indicators normally used by the sectors to 
monitor their activities and progress . . . The main sources of information for the process indicators 
are the sectors themselves (Ministries), but data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) will also 
be collected, as well as information from research, case-studies, and qualitative evaluations. 
(Mozambique 2001) 
 
The implied assumption that RDSs can deliver much of the required information can be compared with 
the more cautious approach adopted in a progress report by the PRSP Secretariat in Pakistan (Pakistan 
2003). This appears to indicate a perceived need for survey-based “validation” of the data derived from 
health and education management information systems (HMIS and NEMIS) and to provide timely 
feedback on intermediate indicators: 
 
The government has decided that a Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) survey would be 
conducted on an annual basis to capture the information relating to all intermediate indicators in the 
full PRSP . . . Similarly the PIHS questionnaire is also being audited to be reflective of all information 
that needs to be captured in relation to outcome of the PRSP process . . . Therefore, intermediate 
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indicators would be captured by CWIQ and final outcome indicators would be monitored through 
PIHS . . . CWIQ would provide quick results as well as third party validation to HMIS and NEMIS 
data relating to the above mentioned intermediate indicators. 
(Pakistan 2003) 
 
This decision, which appears to represent a substantial departure from earlier intentions, may have been 
influenced by a consultancy report (ODI 2002b) which addressed the limitations of the HIS and NEMIS. 
Both were reported to ‘suffer from substantial weaknesses, and are not used very much for the purposes 
for which they were originally intended’. A discussion of the underlying causes included those typically 
cited in this type of assessment: lack of equipment, lack of qualified staff and the need for additional 
training. One specific issue was the problem of recruiting suitably qualified and experienced staff at 
provincial level. The EMIS in Balochistan, for example, was reported to have been ‘essentially non-
functional for two years’ for this reason. This problem, of recruiting and retaining appropriate monitoring 
personnel at lower administrative levels, is one that would be recognised in many countries. 
An additional problem identified in the health sector MIS in Pakistan was the absence of any 
effective linkage between the main system and those associated with parallel programmes. Again this is a 
familiar position. In most countries there are a multiplicity of sectoral information systems, often linked to 
a variety of vertical programmes which have no incentive towards integration or even rationalisation. A 
recent review in Cambodia (Lucas 2002), for example, lists some 20 health monitoring systems, some 
essentially moribund through lack of funding but others linked to programmes (TB, HIV/AIDS, Malaria, 
etc.) with substantial donor support. The latter often have very specific, agreed reporting requirements. 
This may be an advantage if the associated indicators are compatible with the needs of PRS monitoring 
but if not there may be considerable reluctance to suggestions that established procedures should be 
modified in any way. 
There is a wealth of similar documentation detailing the shortcomings of RDSs in most PRS 
countries, even those which regard these systems as essential to PRS monitoring (Annex 2 Note 4). As 
indicated above, many countries see the improvement of at least the EMIS and HMIS as an essential step 
towards an improved PRS monitoring system. However, many donor agencies would probably share the 
more cautious view of the consultancy report on Pakistan (ODI 2002b), which argues that simply meeting 
the needs of PRS monitoring would not provide sufficient justification for the considerable resource 
allocation that would be required. 
 
There is therefore a need to invest substantially in improving the coverage, reliability and timeliness 
of HMIS data – but only if there is a realistic prospect that this information will be widely used in 
policy making and management at province, district and local levels, as well as for PRSP 
monitoring . . . support  to EMIS  can only  be justified  if accompanied  by measures to substantially  
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increase the use of the information collected, and to encourage dissemination and use of EMIS 
results at local level. PRSP monitoring alone does not provide sufficient justification for investing in 
strengthening EMIS. 
(ODI 2002b) 
 
The above report provides no basis on which to assess the magnitude of the “substantial investment” that 
might be involved. In general, while many agencies describe the general shortcomings of RDS, few 
provide any detailed guidance as to how these might be overcome. The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) is one exception to this rule. Its annual country reports typically list 
key indicators, data quality issues and potential corrective actions. In a discussion of key indicators for 
Zambia (USAID/Zambia 2003), for example, it identified problems relating to coverage, quality, level of 
disaggregation and timeliness of the data on primary enrolment in centres intended to provide basic 
education to the most disadvantaged children. A series of possible actions to remedy this situation are 
proposed: 
 
Regular supervision (school visits) by Ministry and/or implementing partner; increased supervision at 
provincial and district levels in 2003; increased training of center mentors; and development of an 
EMIS-based tracking and reporting system . . . If it appears that these actions are insufficient to 
ensure quality information, we will authorize the Implementing Partner to hire special data collectors 
to go to each center to collect the information. 
(USAID/Zambia 2003) 
 
Note that the potential cost implications of the suggested procedures are considerable, given that they 
provide for the intervention of an independent external agency to ensure that routine data collection 
procedures are followed at each of the participating education centres. A similar approach, involving 
systematic data audits at health facilities has been adopted in some health districts in Cambodia – primarily 
those managed by external agencies. It appears to be relatively effective, in that the HMIS data from these 
districts are generally regarded as reliable, whereas those from all other districts are treated with the 
greatest suspicion. However, again such improvements come at a high price (Annex 2 Note 5). 
The WHO has argued that many projects intended to implement or improve national level routine 
information systems in low-income countries have produced little improvement and in some cases made 
matters worse (WHO 1994). They have for many years focused instead on supporting district level health 
information systems: 
 
many national policymakers . . . have decided to attack the information problem at the 
roots…Bolivia, Cameroon, Eritrea, Morocco, New Zealand, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, and South 
Africa are examples  where comprehensive HIS  restructuring efforts have taken place recently or are 
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still underway. One of the more consistent findings of these experiences is that decentralization of 
information management toward the district level is an effective strategy to improve routine 
information systems. 
(Lippeveld 2001) 
 
The new district HMIS in South Africa seems to provide an apparently successful application of this 
approach. However, recent research on a project to improve the HMIS in Uganda finds that it too can run 
into serious problems (Annex 2 Note 6). Health information statistics are generally seen as substantially 
more problematic than those in education. Booth and Lucas (2004) discuss an innovative EMIS in The 
Gambia which should be a primary source of PRS monitoring data and Pernu and Nousiainen (2002) 
suggest that recent work to improve the EMIS in Nepal has also achieved a considerable measure of 
success. 
One additional concern, which should perhaps receive more attention, is that some of the 
information generated by RDS may be politically sensitive. WaterAid (2003) point out that such systems 
are often the source of figures quoted to indicate the improvements achieved by national or local 
governments. They report that in Nepal careful analysis of 22 district profiles indicates that some 56 per 
cent of the population is covered by existing water supply schemes. Moreover, many of the supply systems 
are in need of rehabilitation and the actual percentage served by functioning systems could be as low as 34 
per cent. Both figures are considerably less than the official national estimate of 70 per cent. WaterAid 
describe the pressures on the responsible agency: 
 
Recently DWSS provided data to the National Planning Commission indicating far higher coverage 
than was reported in the district profiles. It seems that DWSS are in a difficult position; on the one 
hand they want to show progress and that coverage is increasing, yet on the other if they show 
coverage to be too high donors are likely to conclude that water supply and sanitation are not 
priorities for investment. 
(WaterAid 2003) 
 
4.2 Sample surveys 
One of the longest running debates of statistical policy has been as to the appropriate use of sample 
surveys as alternatives to RDS. The difficulties of improving the latter to the extent that they can deliver at 
least reasonably useful and reliable data have persuaded many international donors to follow the survey 
route. This in turn has diverted both financial and human resources away from the improvement option 
which, in principle, is generally agreed to be the appropriate long-term approach. This issue naturally arises 
in PRS monitoring, with the added constraint imposed by the relatively short time horizon within which 
results are required. While most of the PRS countries have indicated that they will undertake large-scale 
surveys (living standard management surveys (LSMS), demographic and health surveys (DHS), etc.) at 
various points over the PRS period, for monitoring purposes the main interest lies in the use of routine 
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surveys that are intended to deliver findings at least on an annual basis, or on those specifically intended to 
track policy to outcome links. Here we note three types of survey proposed by a number of countries (all 
deriving from original design work undertaken by the World Bank and other international donors) that 
address three key PRS themes – household poverty, budget tracking and service delivery. 
 
4.2.1 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) 
The CWIQ survey (World Bank 1999) was developed by the World Bank, United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) and the UNDP. It was designed to provide a means by which leading intermediate 
output PRS indicators could be estimated annually using a relatively simple survey instrument on a 
sufficiently large sample of households to allow for necessary disaggregation on at least a regional, gender 
and age basis. It includes indicators on well-being and access to, utilisation of, and satisfaction with, basic 
services. Because of the simple structure and machine-readable format, the time required for data 
processing and analysis should be minimal. The surveys have been adopted by number of African PRS 
countries, including Guinea, Malawi, Rwanda and Senegal, as a source of information on intermediate 
output indicators. As indicated above, Pakistan (Pakistan 2003) has also decided that an annual CWIQ 
survey will be a core component of the implementation monitoring system. 
 
4.2.2 Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) 
PET surveys (Lindelow and Dehn 2001) were designed primarily to track budgeted expenditures down to 
the units providing services (schools, clinics, etc.) to see what proportion of such expenditures reached the 
units and how they were translated into service provision. Because they involve detailed work at facility 
level a range of data on inputs, outputs and quality are collected which are directly relevant to PRS 
requirements. Four countries, Cameroon, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda, specify that such surveys 
will be routinely undertaken in the monitoring and evaluation chapters of their PRSPs. 
Participatory PETS (PPETS), as the name suggests, involve CSOs in the collection, analysis and 
dissemination of input and expenditure data. In the review of 21 PRSPs Schnell and Forster (2003) report 
that nine of these (Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) 
intended to undertake PPETS. 
 
4.2.3 Quantitative Service Delivery Surveys (QSDS) 
These provider surveys, targeted thus far at health facilities and schools, were initially developed as a 
research activity within the World Bank (Dehn, Reinikka and Svensson 2001). They are intended to be 
complementary to PETS, focusing on quantitative performance data derived mainly from the records of 
front-line service delivery units. Exercises have been undertaken in five African countries: Chad, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Nigeria and Uganda. However, thus far only Uganda has explicitly indicated 
that further rounds of the QSDS will be used to provide PRS monitoring information. Though it does not 
mention the QSDS, the consultancy  report on monitoring in Pakistan  (ODI 2002b)  proposes something 
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similar. ‘There is a very strong case for conducting a light, frequently conducted survey, collecting 
information from education and health facilities as well as from households. Such a survey could build on 
the best aspects of the CWIQ and MICS [Middle Indicator Cluster Surveys] surveys.’ 
 
4.3 Special studies and qualitative/participatory monitoring exercises 
As noted above, formal civil society involvement in PRS monitoring systems tends to be focused on 
implementation. In principle, the associated monitoring of input, output and performance satisfaction 
indicators can often have a far more powerful influence on policy processes than final outcome 
monitoring – if timely, reliable data can be collected, analysed and disseminated. This is an important 
concern given the scarce resources available to CSOs and the need to maximise impact and leverage in 
advocating for pro-poor policies. The methodology adopted for such exercises will obviously vary 
according to the objective. Many commentators suggest that in practice a combination of participatory 
and more traditional methods, building on existing information systems where feasible and relevant, may 
be most effective, particularly in influencing high-level policy-makers. The following sections detail 
experiences with some of the most widely used approaches. 
 
4.3.1 Budget monitoring 
The way policy is translated into actual activities on the ground is by having resources allocated to it 
within the annual budget of a country. As such, the budget can be a key vehicle for civil society to monitor 
whether or not a policy is being implemented. There are various stages in the budget process which allow 
opportunities for influence by civil society: budget formulation; budget debate and analysis; and 
monitoring budget implementation (inputs and outputs). 
Oxfam, which has supported a number of such activities, has provided detailed guidance for CSOs in 
influencing budget processes (Oxfam 2002). This document advocates the need to focus on a few critical 
areas, organise activities around a limited number of simple questions and messages and work with 
parliamentarians to feed into budget debates. The difficulty of accessing relevant information on budgets 
(allocations, distributions and spend) is clearly a significant challenge for many CSOs. Again, the Oxfam 
document suggests methods to overcome this potential constraint working with allies, parliamentarians, 
sympathetic government officials and donors. 
The UDN has facilitated civil society monitoring of Poverty Action Funds in Uganda. It has achieved 
this through the establishment of local Poverty Monitoring Committees (PMCs) composed of grassroots 
community representatives. Through a number of workshops, the UDN has developed the skills of these 
committees to be able to organise their own monitoring exercises, publish reports and use them as tools 
for dialogue with local government officials. Such committees now exist across 17 (of around 50) districts 
in Uganda. The UDN reports that a number of these have experienced difficulty in accessing budget data 
and that members are often afraid to issue public complaints. Some monitoring committees have extended 
their activities to campaign against corruption and have joined the Anti Corruption Coalition of Uganda 
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(ACCU) (Gariyo 2002; UDN 2002; Hughes 2002). The Uganda model has been adopted, though as yet 
with less success, in Malawi. Here collaborative work was undertaken between CSOs and the 
Parliamentary Budget and Finance Committee (Lawson 2003). 
Another often-quoted example of budget monitoring relates to the work of the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (Idasa). This is a South African public interest organisation which established 
the Budget Information Service (BIS) to analyse the allocation and use of public resources and to 
understand the impact of the budget on the poor. BIS has become an important source of independent, 
critical analysis of the budget. Equally important, it aims to enhance and facilitate the participation of civil 
society, the media and legislatures in the budget process through education, support and awareness-
raising. Idasa has recently stepped up its efforts to analyse the impact on budgets of the HIV/AIDS crisis, 
following the release of data on the high level of HIV/AIDS incidence among the poor (International 
Budget Project 2001). 
“Social audits”, a term associated with Latin American PRSPs (e.g. Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua) 
is similar in intent to the PPETS described above in that they aim to monitor whether allocated funds 
reach intended beneficiaries. In Bolivia, the Catholic Church, along with 30 other organisations fed their 
poverty reduction priorities into the government-organised “National Dialogue”. High among their 
concerns was the issue of corruption and civil society pressured the government for an ongoing role in 
implementing and monitoring the use of debt relief funds. As a result, the government established a legal 
requirement for civil society oversight in debt relief expenditures (Catholic Relief Services 2003).  
The institutional structure for monitoring activities, the Social Control Mechanism (MCS), is still in 
the process of being defined. However, over 10,000 citizens and small organisations have formed 
departmental and municipal level oversight committees. A national office will provide overall 
coordination, and a “Verification Commission” will ensure transparency and integrity through approval of 
departmental committee staff. Though the MCS strategy has not yet been fully endorsed, some 
committees are already operating and acting on complaints. In a notable achievement, the national office 
intervened in a salary dispute in which health workers had not received payment for three months, despite 
the fact that these salaries are covered by Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) funds. The Minister of 
Health credited the MCS with negotiating a solution to the conflict, and all back salaries were issued as of 
July 2002 (Catholic Relief Services 2003). Such links with formal accountability systems is seen as essential 
(Schnell and Forster 2003) and in Honduras this has involved the establishment of an ongoing 
relationship between CSOs on the one hand and the Comptroller-General, Prosecutor’s Office and the 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the other. 
 
4.3.2 Report cards and satisfaction surveys 
Report cards and satisfaction surveys are regarded as an effective way of gathering systematic feedback 
from citizens on the quality and performance of government service providers, to highlight gaps and 
bottlenecks in service delivery and to improve accountability of service providers. The equivalent of a 
customer satisfaction survey, they reflect peoples’ actual experience and can provide space for their ideas 
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for improvements to be expressed. The concept predates the PRS and was first introduced by the Public 
Affairs Centre in Bangalore, India in 1993. Those surveys not only indicated where people were 
experiencing poor services, but also highlighted very low levels of awareness of anti-poverty programmes 
(Catholic Relief Services 2003). The approach has since been replicated in a number of countries including 
Kenya and the Philippines, and is identified as a PRS monitoring tool in Albania, Ghana, Nepal, Rwanda, 
The Gambia and Uganda. 
 
4.3.3 Poverty observatories 
The UNDP has supported the establishment of “poverty observatories” in a number of countries, 
particularly in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. These vary in character but are essentially independent 
agencies which either undertake or support others to undertake frequent and rapid poverty relevant 
assessments and disseminate findings to both policy-makers and community members. They emphasise 
broad stakeholder participation in the monitoring process. 
A detailed description of an observatory in Vietnam is described by Vu (with Asselin 2001). It is 
based in two poor mountainous districts and aims to provide a comprehensive poverty profile for the 
district populations. This observatory is said to have been established on two basic principles: 
 
Community-based data collection: Local people (leaders of hamlets, mass organisations, rural 
intellectuals, etc.) are involved to be surveyors. Respondents trust local monitors and they are not in 
trouble or shy when they provide their owned information. And, because monitors know their 
community, they have a good sense of whether people are responding truthfully… 
Participatory approach and localisation of information: By empowering and transferring 
information to commune members, people have been able to devise solutions and make decisions on 
their own behalf. Community members and decision-makers can quickly assess which policies are 
effective at fighting the causes of poverty. 
(Vu 2001) 
 
Benin and Burkina Faso have identified poverty observatories as one main source of PRS monitoring data. 
UNDP clearly regards their use as one way to deliver the required “missing middle” indicators: 
 
Since the purpose of monitoring PRSPs is to determine their short-term impact and effectiveness, 
periodic national household surveys will not be sufficient…UNDP should encourage the 
development of more frequent surveys and rapid assessments of the poor and by the poor 
themselves and help to ensure that the results of these surveys are fed back in a timely way to policy-
makers and community leaders. This is one of the goals of the poverty ‘observatories’ in some 
francophone African countries. 
(UNDP 2003b) 
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4.4 Disaggregation issues 
PRS monitoring has tended to focus on the generation of indicators which relate to national populations, 
with the risk that certain sections of those populations (e.g. women, children, the elderly) or particularly 
vulnerable groups (e.g. the disabled, those in remote rural areas, ethnic minorities, urban street-dwellers) 
may continue to suffer, or even be plunged further into poverty as aggregate level indicators appear to 
suggest the success of PRS policies. 
As might be expected, there is a general agreement that disaggregation is in principle intrinsically 
beneficial. 
 
Even though there may be limitations, the better the distinctions drawn between the social strata – 
e.g. between non-landowners and landowning farmers – the better PRSP monitoring will be able to 
determine the causes of poverty and their change over time by the effect of poverty reduction 
strategies. 
(Asche 2003) 
 
However, there is much less agreement as to how and to what extent these issues can be effectively 
addressed, particularly in view of the limited capacity of monitoring systems. Three types of disaggregation 
have been discussed at length in the PRS monitoring literature: poverty and vulnerability; gender; and 
geographical area. A number of other recent studies are included as Annex 2 Note 7. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
It is now widely accepted that in the short run PRS monitoring should focus at least as much on 
implementation progress as on trends in poverty. There is much discussion of the need for “missing 
middle” indicators relating to policy implementation. However, it must be remembered that the lack of 
such indicators in early PRSPs was not a simple oversight. The emphasis on outcomes and impacts 
reflected a reasonable desire for evidence that policies were resulting in actual as opposed to potential 
improvements in the living standards of the poor. In many cases the precise “chains of causality” between 
policies and outcomes were, and remain, problematic and open to debate. Such uncertainty makes the 
selection of appropriate indicators problematic and this is reflected in the “scatter-gun” (collect 
information on a large number of possibly useful indicators) or “usual suspects” (estimate the standard 
indicators recommended by international agencies) approaches commonly proposed. In many cases, even 
if “optimal” indicators (i.e. most appropriate given a clear understanding as to how a policy initiative is 
intended to produce a desired outcome) can be defined, they may well prove difficult or expensive to 
estimate to the required accuracy over the timescale required. 
Given resource constraints, the suggestion by DANIDA that budget allocations and expenditures 
may be the most appropriate focus for short-term monitoring is an interesting starting point, particularly if 
it involves effective tracking exercises with mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability. This is 
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a similar route to that proposed in the Kenya Interim PRSP (IPRSP) (discussed in Booth and Lucas 2001). 
Linking these data to a small set of basic service provision indicators that can reliably reflect annual 
changes – school attendance, health care utilisation, boreholes constructed, etc. – could provide a 
reasonable starting point in assessing if a PRS is on track. 
Routine data systems have the great potential advantage that they can deliver disaggregated 
information which allows policy-makers to determine not just that schools and hospitals in general are 
failing to improve service delivery but also which specific schools and hospitals are failing or succeeding. 
They may sometimes even be able to show that such failures are not in relation to the population as a 
whole but only to women, the elderly, particular ethnic groups, etc. If the quality problems could be 
overcome they would often be far more useful than sample surveys, but that remains a daunting and at 
least medium-term task. One question which is rarely addressed is whether the poor quality could be at 
least ameliorated in the short run by analytical means. For example, even where there is a known bias, for 
example, lack of returns from the poorest areas, this is often ignored or at best treated by means of a 
crude ad hoc adjustment in the estimation of indicators. It would seem useful to at least explore further the 
possibilities for combining routine data with other sources to generate genuine “best estimates”. 
Experience suggests that surveys tend to be donor-driven. Few statistical offices can resist proposals 
for large well-resourced surveys, even if this means diverting their best personnel from other planned 
activities. The preference for survey-based data is understandable and may be perfectly rational in the 
short term. The task of designing, implementing and analysing even a large-scale national sample survey 
under difficult circumstances is much less daunting than attempting to extract reliable data from the often 
routine data systems that exist in many PRS countries. Surveys are typically the only source of data that 
can be readily disaggregated by population socio-economic characteristics, in some instances even 
allowing direct comparison of outcomes as between the poor and the non-poor. They can be also be used 
to enhance the value of routine data systems, for example by demonstrating the links between 
geographical and socio-economic factors as in poverty mapping. 
Of greater concern is that the preferences of donors are sometimes evident not only in terms of 
timing but also in terms of detailed content. This may be based on the desire for internationally 
comparative data or simply on the fact that it is easier to adopt a mainly standardised package than 
attempt wholesale localisation. In the case of the CWIQ surveys, for example, because they utilise 
machine-readable questionnaires, amending the content entails modification of the supporting software. 
The PETS and QSDS can be seen as valuable attempts to address the “missing-middle” issue, seeking to 
quantify the links in the chain between policy and outcome. However, given that they originated in a 
specific research context, it may again be reasonable to question if their content is optimal for the use to 
which they are now being put. An interesting question would be: “What is the minimum data required 
from such surveys to provide the necessary evidence on PRS implementation issues in each specific 
country?” This might result in a considerable simplification of current survey procedures. 
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Donors are often reluctant to become involved in potentially long-drawn-out and technical debates 
on the reliability of specific indicators. Even attempts at constructive discussion on possible sources of 
error can easily provoke defensive or antagonistic responses from those who feel that their professional 
skills are being challenged by powerful outsiders. In many cases donors will prefer to seek out alternative 
sources – bypassing the responsible agency to seek out data from other government departments or 
possibly urging the need for yet another round of data collection. The USAID approach, of requiring the 
quality of key indicators to be openly assessed and alternative methods of improving quality proposed 
where necessary is an interesting model. 
It would be helpful if the distinction between qualitative methods and participation were more clearly 
maintained. There is general acceptance that qualitative methods, which include a range of tools often 
associated with participatory approaches, can help to overcome some of the weaknesses in quantitative 
methods, drawing out issues and explanatory factors that can be missed by analysis of information from 
RDS or traditional surveys. Their disadvantages have equally been the subject of a substantial literature. 
Such arguments have lead to a widespread acceptance of the use of complementary qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Triangulation of sources is generally accepted as offering possibilities for increasing 
the richness and reliability of analysis (McGee with Norton 2000; Carvalho and White 1997). However, 
the routine labelling of qualitative exercises as “participatory”, which often seems to be done in order to 
emphasise agencies’ concern with community involvement and “ownership”, may be becoming counter-
productive. 
This practice has generated considerable antagonism, certainly within many international NGOs, 
over what is widely regarded as the hijacking of the participation agenda by the international financial 
institutions (IFIs). For them the defining characteristic of “participatory” monitoring is that civil society 
has overall control of the monitoring process. 
 
The key distinction should be the degree of control and involvement that participants have in 
determining the scope and themes of enquiry, in generating data, in analysis and in the generation of 
recommendations or solutions. Many of the forms of enquiry currently described as “participatory” 
involve informants only in the generation of information. (Participation) appears to involve 
substituting questionnaires with the templates for PRA diagrams and asking people to fill in the 
blanks, capturing their “voices” as they speak. 
(Lucas and Cornwall 2003) 
 
A useful and workable distinction might be to reserve the “participation” word to monitoring activities 
which are independent of government or donor agency control. This would by no means exclude such 
activities – simply that they would be formally labelled as qualitative or rapid appraisal exercises. 
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5  Using the results – dissemination, analysis and policy change 
The World Bank proposes that dissemination should involve ‘mechanisms tailored to different groups in 
civil society, as well as policy makers, programme managers, programme beneficiaries, the general public, 
the media and academics’ (World Bank 2000, cited in Pain and Kirsch 2002). The diversity of information 
needs and absorptive capacities of each of these groups needs to be taken into account in designing 
dissemination strategy (Pain and Kirsch 2002). 
Here, we consider two aspects of the use of PRS findings: direct feedback mechanisms which should 
have the potential to change specific policies; and broader issues of communication with the population at 
large. Finally, the relationship of Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) to PRS monitoring is briefly 
considered. 
 
5.1 Feedback and policy review mechanisms 
The ODI consultancy report on Pakistan (ODI 2002b) discusses the need to address the issue of how the 
findings of the monitoring system can be effectively used to enhance policy. They suggest that the lack of 
mechanisms to achieve this is a serious weakness: 
 
there is much more to PRS monitoring than just compiling and reporting on the monitoring 
indicators . . . One key function is the need for in-depth evaluation of PRS policies, especially if 
monitoring indicators suggest that these are not having the intended effects, which leads into a 
broad process of discussion and review of PRS policies. No mechanism for the latter has yet 
been established, and no institution has been identified that would fulfil the in-depth evaluation role 
(which in practice might involve identifying and commissioning special studies, information 
collection activities etc.). It is probably preferable that this institution is different from the one 
responsible for compiling and reporting on the monitoring indicators. 
(ODI 2002b) 
 
The minimal outputs of PRS monitoring, which might be seen as one such feedback mechanism as far as 
donors are concerned, are the required annual PRS Progress Reports to the IFIs. Stakeholder participation 
in the preparation of this report varies widely (Schnell and Forster 2003). In Albania, as discussed below, a 
distinct CSO report is prepared in parallel. In other cases the stakeholder groups, usually those involved in 
the original PRSP consultations, may be involved on a continuous basis in the preparation of the report, 
commenting and proposing revisions and ensuring the awareness of a wider audience (e.g. Honduras, 
Nicaragua, The Gambia). A third common approach is via a series of consultative workshops with a 
variety of stakeholders, intended to inform and invite comment (e.g. Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guyana, Malawi, Uganda). 
In some cases it is suggested that the progress report may be the only output (ODI 2003a). Of the 34 
PRS countries, 12 have at least one progress report on the PRSP website and just three have two or more. 
Given that specification of the monitoring system was not an issue on which a PRSP risked rejection, the 
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initial progress reports generally reflect the fact that such systems are at a very early stage of development. 
It is not the intention here to review those documents, but it is evident from a cursory examination that 
they are very substantial (often 300 pages or more), have clearly taken considerable effort to produce and 
that much of the quantitative information presented tends to pre-date the PRS period. 
A compelling example of a much simpler feedback mechanism, in this case to government policy-
makers, is quoted in PRSP Synthesis Note 7 (ODI 2003a). A study in Uganda by the PMAU demonstrated 
that increased investment in the water sector had not resulted in an increase in the number of sources of 
safe water. This is reported to have directly influenced a decision that reforms should be undertaken 
before additional funding would be made available. This example seems to bear a close resemblance to the 
series of PSIA studies conducted recently by the IFIs and DFID in a number of PRS countries (Hanmer 
and Hendrie 2002). Its attractiveness from a monitoring perspective lies in the fact that the data could be 
easily and inexpensively assembled and open to an unambiguous interpretation which was difficult for 
those responsible to refute. Schnell and Forster (2003) note that the PSIA approach was still being 
developed at the time many PRSPs were prepared and thus few (Uganda being one exception) mention it. 
However, ‘they have a substantial potential for opening up impact monitoring and evaluation to 
participatory approaches’. 
Feedback mechanisms are by no means intended to be restricted to policy-makers and programme 
managers. A number of the participatory monitoring approaches discussed above are specifically intended 
to include a phase when findings are fed back by communities into policy discussion. Asche (2003), for 
example, describes the way in which GTZ intended Qualitative Impact Analysis (QIM) to work in Malawi: 
 
1. In cooperation with the government – in fact, by the government itself – certain sectors and 
poverty dimensions are selected and compared over time in order to be able to reveal trends with 
regard to issues on which policymakers need feedback from the population. Following the 
integration of QIM into the PRSP process, these naturally include poverty-related and socio-political 
issues. 
2. Surveys and group discussions are held in selected districts. Even these decentralised processes are 
guided/chaired by specially trained central government officers who are thus exposed to a local 
reality that they are frequently unfamiliar with. 
3. The prepared results are finally directly fed back into central government's decision-making 
processes, and also disseminated to the wider public in the country in question. 
(Asche 2003) 
 
Asche argues that the specific aim of this process was to engage governments and strengthen 
accountability. The results are described as encouraging, with evidence that it did sometimes result in 
policy change. 
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5.2 Communications 
The PRSP Sourcebook includes a discussion on communications strategy which suggests that ‘strategic 
use of communication tools and concepts can help ensure this process of inclusion through sharing and 
dissemination of information and knowledge at all levels of society’. It argues that popular ownership of 
the PRS ‘relies on accurate, consistent and continuous communication that provokes response and 
encourages debate and dialogue’. To illustrate the problem, a study by the Panos Institute (2002) of the 
roles of different stakeholders in PRSP processes in Uganda, Lesotho and Ethiopia found that, in spite of 
the supposed emphasis on ownership, participation and widespread consultation, most people in those 
countries had no idea what a PRSP is. 
Widespread dissemination of information to civil society is obviously one key to increase overall PRS 
understanding, ownership and engagement. In most cases this task is allocated to government agencies – 
typically under the ministry of finance or ministry of planning. Three countries describe distinctive 
dissemination models in their PRSPs. The Ugandan approach (which includes the Poverty Forum, a 
periodic public debate on poverty issues, and publication of the biennial Poverty Status Report and a 
range of other PMAU outputs) is generally seen as a good traditional example. The arrangement in 
Albania, where the government has indicated that it will invite CSOs to jointly prepare an independent 
report which will be appended to the annual PRS progress report, seems an interesting and innovative 
mechanism for a more formal channel of communication. However, there must be doubts as to what 
would happen in practice if the two documents were seriously contradictory. In Tanzania, a multi-
stakeholder working group has been established to take responsibility for the overall design and 
implementation of the dissemination strategy. 
The Panos report (2002) makes the argument that the media should be among the best-positioned 
institutions for the role of information dissemination, stimulating public debate and acting as a 
government watchdog. A strong and independent media should be able to provide information to citizens 
which would allow them to take a more active role in policy dialogues which are going to impact on their 
lives. Unfortunately, they suggest, in most developing countries the media are not prepared, or themselves 
well enough informed, for this role. 
The reasons for the lack of interest in, and awareness of, issues relating to PRSPs among the media 
need to be analysed and addressed. As Panos note, there is a preference for politics and entertainment 
over reporting on poverty or development issues. Furthermore, in Africa in particular, there are few 
specialist journalists trained in economics or development issues. Media in many countries are principally 
urban-based, and have relatively little interest in issues in rural areas. Finally, poor relationships between 
media and government or NGOs limit the flow of relevant information from these sources to journalists. 
Of course, in many PRS countries the press is largely government controlled and not free to share 
information that will call its legitimacy into question. Hudock (2003) notes that of the first 19 countries to 
complete a PRSP only two can be said to have a free press according to a Freedom House assessment. 
She argues that the potential of the media in PRSP processes remains largely untapped, and media reform 
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should be more highly prioritised in PRSPs themselves. Though, as indicated above, the PRSP 
Sourcebook highlights the importance of the use of the media, few financial and technical resources are 
directed to supporting relevant initiatives. Hudock recognises that there would be serious concerns if 
donors were seen as directly supporting particular national media outlets. However, she suggests that they 
could play a useful role in supporting regulations and institutions which encourage development of the 
sector. UNDP (2001) has conducted PRSP-related media training sessions in Malawi. 
As noted above, many civil society monitoring activities have remained outside the government 
systems with the purpose of providing an independent source of information to advocate for policy 
change. Possing (2003) suggests that despite a lack of encouragement from the World Bank and other 
donors to take this more critical, rather than collaborative, role there is significant evidence of civil society 
action in this area. He argues that NGOs can play a key part to play in sensitising and mobilising local 
people, to make them aware of their rights to public information and accountability roles. One key area in 
which civil society can, and does, play a significant communications role is in working to expose and 
control corruption. As noted above, the UDN in Uganda has been strongly involved in training and 
awareness-raising on this issue and has helped to set up a regional anti-corruption coalition (Gariyo 
2002:3). 
 
5.3 PRS monitoring and PSIA 
A report to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003), evaluating World Bank and IMF support to the 
PRSP process in seven countries (Bolivia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and 
Zambia) complains that very little formal, systematic assessment of policy impact had been undertaken: 
 
Thorough and comprehensive poverty diagnostics in the form of ex-post and ex-ante PSIAs, which 
should form the foundation of the PRSP have not yet been systematically applied in any of the 
reviewed countries. Hence PSIAs have not been applied yet in policy priorities and for undertaking 
trade-offs. (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003) 
 
The report suggests that support by the Nordic donors for the application of PSIA will assist a situation in 
which such support has previously been uncoordinated and on a case-by-case basis. This is intended to 
allow an established feedback process, use of PSIA to provide an input to the design of the PRS 
monitoring system and greater transparency, through the dissemination of PSIA information to a wide 
audience. 
Pilot PSIA exercises in five PRS countries, Armenia, Honduras, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda 
(Hanmer and Hendrie 2002) appear to support the idea that focused studies can produce policy-relevant 
findings within a relatively short timeframe (40 days) and based mainly on existing information. Of 
particular interest is the discussion of the need for both quantitative and qualitative information and the 
value of micro-level and case study data in addition to the traditional household survey data.  ‘Small, short, 
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rapid appraisal methods can pay big dividends, and national knowledge can . . . provide useful “rules of 
thumb” regarding economic behaviour by which first order approximations of impact can be judged’ 
(Hanmer and Hendrie 2002). 
The above report mentions that one study, in Honduras, was constrained by the absence of a social 
accounting matrix (SAM). While such frameworks are costly to develop, the broad insights into general 
equilibrium effects that they can provide are almost impossible to envisage by other means. Future PSIA 
work may be assisted by the work of the International Food Policy Institute, which has developed a series 
of highly disaggregated SAMs for a number of the poorest countries. Two interesting examples are given 
in Annex 2 Note 8. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
With a few notable exceptions (for example, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Vietnam), it seems that at 
least in the short run there will be limited overt demand for PRS monitoring data in government, other 
than that generated by the need to meet the requirements of donor review processes. This will especially 
be the case for those PRS indicators initially developed for the IPRSP, which are widely seen as driven by 
the IFIs and lacking local ownership. If the link between performance monitoring and donor funding is 
used to promote PRS implementation, it may result in perverse incentives in terms of monitoring. If 
failure to achieve agreed targets has unpleasant financial consequences there is little incentive to 
strengthen monitoring systems which have the potential to highlight that failure. The appropriate 
approach would seem to be to encourage the identification of bottlenecks and if necessary offer the 
possibility of additional support in overcoming them. 
While many countries have expressed a general interest in improving their statistical M&E capacity 
there is as yet little evidence as to the potential implications for the policy process. Few PRS countries 
(Uganda and Tanzania perhaps provide recent counter-examples) have traditionally used performance 
monitoring or evidence-based research to drive policy change or budget allocation decisions. In general 
policy is political and personal (Booth and Lucas 2004). Modification of this position is possible but not 
without the establishment of appropriate incentives. For example, in Uganda the formal links which have 
been established between poverty orientation and allocation of funds from the PAF is reported to have 
considerably increased the demand for data and analysis by line ministries (Schnell and Forster 2003). 
In the absence of such specific incentives, PRS monitoring agencies will need to have very good 
marketing and communications skills if they are to persuade government officials and civil society of the 
value to them of the information being produced. Tailoring feedback to match the specific interests of 
targeted stakeholders is clearly of great importance. This applies to sectoral ministries and local 
governments as much as to CSOs. Two specific approaches seem to have made some headway. 
Governments,  both  national  and  local,  and  CSOs  do appear to  be very  sensitive to  comparative and 
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ranking indicators, which show their position relative to another country, province, district, etc. For 
similar reasons, poverty mapping also appears intrinsically attractive and offers considerable scope both in 
dissemination and in generating responses that can influence policy debate.2 
The PSIA exercises quoted above provide very attractive examples of the type of policy analysis 
process which could engender a greater interest in the use of PRS data, if it became part of the routine 
activities of the monitoring system. Again, given the capacity constraints, it may be necessary initially to 
base such activities on the technical secretariat, possibly reinforced by local or national consultants. 
However, extending the basic approach to involve CSOs would be an attractive possibility. 
 
                                                 
2  Note that the NIMES proposal in Uganda recognises the importance of this approach by including a specific 
Geographical Information System (GIS) coordinating committee as one of its key components. 
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Annex 2 Notes and additional material 
1. In Tanzania a Round Table on Poverty Monitoring included stakeholders from government, academic 
and research institutions, NGOs and donors. The resulting structure is headed by a Poverty Monitoring 
Steering Committee, which has representatives from each of these groups and is intended to provide 
general guidance. The linked Technical Committee for the Poverty Reduction Strategy takes responsibility 
for preparation of the Annual PRS Progress Reports, supported by a Poverty Monitoring Secretariat, 
based in the Vice President’s Office and staffed from that office, the Ministry of Finance and the 
President’s Office. Four Technical Working Groups – Surveys and Census, Routine Data Systems, 
Research and Analysis, and Dissemination, Sensitisation and Advocacy – each of which includes 
stakeholders from government, non-government groups and/or donors, are tasked with the substantial 
work on poverty monitoring. Of particular interest, an autonomous research institution, Research on 
Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), was mandated by the government to play a lead role in determining priority 
areas for research and analysis of progress (DANIDA 2001). 
 
2. The “Vision” of a PRS monitoring and reporting system presented at a meeting in 2002 (SPA 2002) of 
the SPA Task Team on the Post full-PRSP Process: 
 
• A single, overarching review process 
• Production of a singe Progress Report using information generated by the national system 
• Process led by government – Progress Report disseminated to national stakeholders, covering key 
issues identified through national consultations 
• Review is timed to the budget cycle so that results feed into budget process 
• Review covers agreed indicators (drawn from the PRSP) outlined in a single, common performance 
assessment framework negotiated with donors 
• Required data at sector and national level kept to a minimum. Information on inputs and outcomes 
supplemented by financial reporting and PERs 
• Sector and project R & M [reporting and monitoring] requirements function as building blocks 
feeding into the review process 
• Consultative Group meetings used to underwrite the process and engage a broad range of 
stakeholders 
 
3. Tanzania provides an example of civil society–government joint monitoring initiative, though the 
degree to which civil society acts on an equal footing with government is questionable. The Poverty 
Monitoring System (PMS) is the government institution which will provide the data and information 
required for the monitoring and evaluation of the PRS. Non-state involvement takes the form of four 
national lobby networks and one international NGO which are included in the national Poverty 
Monitoring Steering Committee. Civil society actors have also been invited to participate in two of the 
four PMS Technical Working Groups. Gould and Ojanen (2003) note that the hand-picked membership 
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of the Research and Analysis group includes mainly academic and donor non-state actors rather than local 
advocacy organisations. However, the fact that this group has ensured the incorporation of a PPA within 
the PMS has opened a key channel for broader civil society influence on the PRS policy process. Among 
the 15 members of the PPA implementing consortium were five national NGOs, five international NGOs 
and the Institute of Development Studies of the University of Dar es Salaam. These worked alongside the 
lead agency (a not-for-profit academic consultancy) and three government agencies (the President’s office, 
Finance and National Bureau of Statistics). 
The design of the PMS, including the use of a PPA as a pivotal policy feedback mechanism was 
strongly promoted by UNDP (Gould and Ojanen 2003). It is still unclear, however, how PPA findings will 
feed into the PRS process and its budgetary framework. Gould and Ojanen therefore suggest that the 
PMS ‘does not wield direct political clout in any measurable degree and the higher echelons of decision 
making authority are buffered against the direct influence of non-state actors (or “the poor”) by an 
ambiguous and multi-staged chain of bureaucratic reporting systems’. 
In Uganda, the UDN Poverty Action Fund (PAF) monitoring runs in parallel to government. 
Findings from civil society monitoring are fed to the relevant official agencies to validate or challenge 
government findings (UDN 2002). This arrangement is said to work reasonably well and the UDN also 
participates in PAF quarterly meetings organised by the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic 
Development (MoFPED). In terms of PRS implementation, it is the responsibility of local government, 
supervised by sectoral ministries, to monitor outputs. The UDN is also setting up a broader Community 
Based Monitoring and Evaluation System (CBMES) to mobilise community members in assessing the 
process and quality of service delivery. This has been successfully piloted in one district, and lessons 
drawn for scaling up. However, there are serious resource constraints (UDN 2002).  
 
4. The Tanzania Poverty Monitoring Master Plan (Tanzania 2001) argues that: 
 
RDS provide data at regular intervals, annually or more frequently, while surveys and the census can 
only provide estimates at relatively long intervals. In the context of the PRSP, frequent estimates of 
poverty monitoring indicators are required. Secondly, many existing RDS are national in their 
coverage and can provide disaggregated information at district and ward levels. As the success of the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy depends to a large extent on appropriate actions by Local Government 
Authorities (LGAs), the data generated by RDS are of great importance. 
 
However, it also describes the “major challenges” faced in ensuring the quality and timeliness of the 
information derived. The HMIS notionally covers all health facilities in the country (including public, 
NGO and private) and is described as a major tool for planning, monitoring and evaluation. However, its 
use is said to be limited by the poor quality of information, delays in reporting, and limited dissemination 
of findings. The underlying problems are the subject of a detailed assessment in an interesting thesis 
(Mukama 2003), which also considers the comparable system in Mozambique. Similarly, the usefulness of 
the EMIS is said to be constrained by: failure to submit data or incomplete reporting by some schools; 
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inaccurate returns due to poor record keeping; attempts to disguise or distort information by some head 
teachers; delays in distributing and/or returning forms; and frequent errors made at the various levels of 
data aggregation. 
A Uganda PEAP monitoring strategy document (Uganda 2002) confirms the general poor quality of 
data available and identifies the causes as: 
 
inadequate logistical support, in terms of equipment, transport facilities, and allowances, which has 
resulted in poor supervision of many routine monitoring activities; inadequate skills and weak 
incentives to collect and analyze data, especially at the local levels, with the result that most 
administrative data are not properly recorded. 
 
These problems are said to result in biased or simply inaccurate data that is often incomplete because of 
reporting delays. The document also underlines an additional well-known problem in that: ‘most routine 
administrative data are facility-based. They provide information on those already getting access to services, 
not on those who are for one reason or another outside the reach of current provision.’ However, with all 
these limitations the document still argues that the government must provide the support required to 
make the systems function effectively if they are to monitor the priority programmes for poverty 
reduction. 
A consultancy report on the Malawi PRS monitoring system (Kiregyera, Scott, Ajayi and Nsemukila 
2002) again discusses some of the underlying causes of the poor quality of data delivered and emphasises 
that a simple “technical fix” based on computerisation will not be sufficient. It suggests that the failure: 
 
results from a lack of resources, limited human capacity, high staff turn-over, weak incentives and the 
absence of a discriminating demand for information by policy-makers. Where computerised MIS 
have been introduced, the problem is not only the risk of a mismatch between the demands of the 
hard/software and the managerial/technical skills available, but the fundamental lack of experience in 
systematically using data to inform decision-making. 
(Kiregyera et al. 2002) 
 
5. In the district managed by Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF), for example, they and UNICEF provide by 
far the largest component of health staff salaries and have a decisive influence on the terms and conditions 
of service (van Damme and Meessen 2001). They can therefore both provide incentives and create a 
framework within which these can be linked to performance. This is in line with the advice given by 
Conway and Beckerleg (2002) in a discussion of the general low quality of routine health information in 
Cambodia: ‘Extremely low salaries are a major impediment to improving performance . . . However, to be 
effective in improving performance, salary supplements must be linked with improved Human Resource 
management procedures.’ Unfortunately, the level of funding required to ensure success is probably only 
available where long-term external support is available. In the Cambodia case, attempts to extend the audit 
approach to districts which lack such support have been much less successful. 
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6. Recent research on a project to improve the HMIS in Uganda (Gladwin et al. 2003) appears to identify 
serious problems with an approach based on establishing decentralised systems. The central issue would 
seem to be that too much attention was focused on narrow technical aspects of the new system and too 
little on critical organisational and human resource issues. For example: 
 
The hierarchy of power in health units and at district level constrained HMIS implementation, as 
decentralization was not fully enacted or understood. The previous hierarchy of power placed the 
Medical Records Officer (MRO) in a lowly position, but the district MRO was now expected to be an 
HMIS supervisor, even of clinically trained staff, and fellow DHT members were expected to 
produce reports the MRO could file, collate and even interpret, which meant he had the right to 
demand reports from these staff. 
(Gladwin, Dixon and Wilson 2003) 
 
Training health workers in the use of the new system proved much more demanding than expected. The 
most difficult area related to low-level staff undertaking relative mundane tasks: 
 
unfounded assumptions were made about health unit staff and procedures when identifying relevant 
information management strategies. For example, HMIS data collection, processing and information 
use assumes a certain level of general education and specialist training amongst health workers, but 
this was not available, especially in smaller health units. Too few support supervision visits for HMIS 
training were made for health unit personnel to grasp new skills, such as data processing, compiling 
graphs and statistics. 
(Gladwin et al. 2003) 
 
Greater success appears to have been achieved in South Africa (Wilson, Hedberg, Rohdde and Puchert 
2003). The District Health Information System (DHIS), which was first piloted in 1997, has become a 
nationwide system which is being exported to a number of other countries in the region and appears to be 
generally highly regarded. The indicators provided seem highly correlated with PRS “missing middle” 
requirements. 
 
The DHIS is capable of reporting monthly, enabling timely action to rectify deficiencies. Indeed, for 
less dynamic measures of the system, the annual clinic audit has proven to provide good data on a 
range of useful measures: personnel levels, service provision schedules, infrastructure, equipment and 
objective measures of quality. These supplement the monthly data on service provision, drug 
supplies, work loads and disease patterns that can change rapidly. The system is most useful if it can 
provide fast and up to date indicators of what the problems are and where they are localised. 
(Wilson et al. 2003) 
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7. Disaggregation issues 
 
Vulnerability and targeting 
In a review which covers the PRSPs for six countries and IPRSPs for a further 14, Marcus and Wilkinson 
(2002) found that ‘While poverty statistics were sometimes disaggregated into poor and extremely poor, as 
in Ghana and Kyrgyzstan, the distinction between chronic and transient poverty was never mentioned nor 
was the meaning of vulnerability in particular country, regional or social contexts spelt out.’ However, 
‘almost all . . . identify “vulnerable social groups” including: children, older people, disabled people, 
refugees and people living in isolated areas.’ They argue that the focus on quantitative data sources has 
tended to limit the possibilities for addressing diversity and that the use of more qualitative and 
participatory methods ‘should enable a more nuanced picture of poverty and disadvantage to emerge.’ 
A recent study on the degree to which poverty reduction strategies will actually target the poor in 
terms of improving health status (Laterveer, Niessen and Yazbeck 2003) systematically examines the first 
batch of 23 HIPC IPRSPs. The aim was to assess the extent to which they actually pursue the pro-poor 
focus of health policies as set down in national policy documents. The findings indicated that there was 
little effort to analyse health issues in relation to the poor, or to include the specific interests of the poor in 
health policy design. One area of special concern was ‘the effort put into collection and use of poverty-
related health data. Although 57% of the documents state that health surveys were conducted, the poor 
are rarely mentioned’. 
A more recent review by the WHO (2004) again looked for evidence, this time in PRSPs, of 
geographical or vulnerability targeting relating to health policies. ‘Overall, this was difficult to find. For 
example, of the 21 PRSPs reviewed that addressed communicable diseases (other than HIV/AIDS), only 
one explicitly targeted poor populations or regions.’ The only exception related to water and sanitation 
policies, where rural/urban targeting was adopted in half of the documents. Four different approaches to 
targeting were identified overall: by urban/rural; by region or district (for example, the Vietnamese PRSP 
links policy on poor and remote mountainous areas to specific measurable targets on availability of 
medical staff and health facilities); targeting the poor(est), typically by providing financial assistance for 
health care costs; and targeting specific vulnerable groups such as women or indigenous populations (for 
example, the Bolivian PRSP targets the proportion of the indigenous population covered by basic health 
services). The failure to address the poorest groups was seen as a major weakness: 
 
Few PRSPs attempt to monitor the impact of their health programmes on the poorest members of 
the population…For example, out of the 21 country health strategies that address communicable 
diseases, only one presented poverty-focused indicators to monitor the programme. The figures are 
the same for reproductive and maternal health programmes, although slightly improved for 
HIV/AIDS  (three)  and  child  health  (two) .  . .   It  has  been  well argued that  health programmes 
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focused on the needs of the poor will not necessarily reach the poorest groups. Poverty-focused 
monitoring indicators are thus a key tool for assessing the impact of health programmes on poor 
people – a tool which most PRSPs fail to employ in their health strategies. 
(WHO 2004) 
 
Gender 
One of the most discussed areas in terms of the need for an approach to PRS monitoring which 
acknowledges diversity is that of gender. The review by Marcus and Wilkinson (2002) ‘confirms the World 
Development Movement’s (2001) assessment that gender analysis is largely missing in PRSPs and IPRSPs’ 
except for ‘a few references to the poverty of female- versus male-headed households, or to differences in 
boys’ and girls’ school enrolment rates’. With the exception of Kenya and Honduras, ‘other gender issues, 
including access to land or other assets, employment, or issues of gender and governance were not 
mentioned’. 
A major contribution to the World Bank and IMF PRSP Review was provided by UNIFEM (2001). 
This was based on assessments done by NGOs, consultants and national women’s groups in countries 
with both interim and full PRSPs. The study reviewed a wide range of IPRSPs, PRSPs and secondary 
literature from Laos, Yemen, Lesotho, Ghana, Bolivia, Lesotho and Tanzania. The report argues that data 
collection is one of the key areas where there is a singular lack of gender dimension in the PRSPs. One 
example quoted is that analysis of gender as a cross-cutting dimension is typically restricted to a few 
specific sectors such as health and education, where gender issues are traditionally addressed. It suggests 
that because attention is still focused on conventional measures of poverty, available monitoring data 
cannot adequately address the poverty levels of women. 
A review of 15 IPRSPs and three PRSPs by the World Bank’s Gender Division was reported in 
Kabeer (2002). This indicated that: less than half discussed gender issues in any detail in their diagnosis of 
poverty; few integrated gender analysis into their monitoring and evaluation sections; while gendered 
information was usually provided for health, nutrition and population and to a lesser extent education, in 
other places gender was typically mentioned in passing or with a “vague intention”. 
A more recent study (Bell 2003) was based on Information gathered from interviews with key people 
in governments, NGOs, Danish embassies and academic institutions as well as Internet and library 
resources. The report provides an overview on gender and PRSPs with particular reference to Tanzania, 
Bolivia, Vietnam and Mozambique. While again generally pessimistic, it does suggest that community-
based assessments which have a strong emphasis on social differentiation, such as the PPAs in Tanzania 
and Vietnam, are likely to encourage gender-sensitive monitoring. ‘Experiences with participatory poverty 
assessments (PPAs) show that gender issues arise more strongly if a participatory approach informs 
poverty diagnosis (McGee, Levene and Hughes 2002)’ (cited in Bell 2003). However, it also points out 
that effective implementation of PPAs may be possible in a country such as Tanzania, which has a history 
of solid gender analysis skills and experience of gender advocacy at different levels, but is much more 
difficult in countries such as Mozambique which lack such expertise and experience. 
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Whitehead (2003) considers the ways in which gender issues are addressed in relation to the PRSPs 
of Tanzania, Bolivia, Malawi and Yemen. It asks why they differ, and how this is linked to the particular 
design of each PRSP process. The analysis is based on telephone interviews and a review of primary and 
secondary documents. It concludes that a gendered PRSP analysis should highlight gender inequality as a 
cause of poverty, the different experiences of poverty for women and men and the different effects of 
policy and budgetary decisions on women and men. It also calls for a broader perspective on poverty 
measurement to address dimensions which particularly affect women: vulnerability, powerlessness, 
voicelessness and male-biased governance systems. 
 
Geographical disaggregation 
The basis for concern here is well described by Bird, Hulme, Moore and Shepherd (2002): 
 
there is clear evidence of the existence of “hardcore poverty” in “spatial poverty traps” in rural areas 
in the developing world and good grounds for believing that contemporary development processes 
will ensure that such concentrations of human deprivation will persist and deepen in coming decades 
. . . Almost 1.8 billion people live ‘in less favoured areas including marginal agricultural, forest and 
woodland, and arid areas’ (Pender et al. 2001)’. 
(Bird et al. 2002) 
 
A research exercise in South Africa (McIntyre, Muirhead and Gilson 2002) looked at the possibilities of 
identifying geographical poverty traps by defining small-area-based indices of deprivation. The project: 
 
looked at the feasibility of developing a broad-based area deprivation index in a data scarce context 
and considered the implications of such an index for geographic resource allocations. Despite certain 
data problems, it was possible to construct and compare three different indices: a general index of 
deprivation (GID), compiled from census data using principal component analysis; a policy-
perspective index of deprivation (PID), based on groups identified as priorities within policy 
documents; and a single indicator of deprivation (SID), selected for relevance and feasibility of use. 
The findings demonstrate clearly that in South Africa deprivation is multi-faceted, is concentrated in 
specific areas within the country and is correlated with ill-health. However, the formula currently 
used by the National Treasury to allocate resources between geographic areas, biases these allocations 
towards less deprived areas within the country. The inclusion of the GID within this formula would 
dramatically alter allocations towards those areas suffering from human development deficits.”  
(McIntyre et al. 2002) 
 
An early research exercise in Cambodia (Attfield 2000) emphasised the attractiveness of map data and 
makes a case for their use in a policy context: 
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The quality and effectiveness of the GIS output allowed the visualisation and comprehension of 
abstract concepts. This stimulated demand for the development of the system and has enabled the 
education policy development process. In particular, policy on equity of access to education has had 
to be re-evaluated based on the graphic demonstration using the GIS that poverty and not distance 
was the major barrier to school attendance. Without the initial investment and development of the 
GIS it would not have been possible to rapidly and effectively communicate ideas relating to 
education policy and strategy. 
 
In Vietnam, Minot, Baulch and Epprecht (2003) undertook an original project aimed at examining spatial 
patterns in poverty and inequality, with the idea that this information could improve the targeting of 
poverty alleviation programmes. Their method of geographical disaggregation relies on the presence of 
two major datasets, the Vietnam LSMS survey for 1997/8 and the Population Census for 1999. Poverty 
estimates at the commune level were made in four steps. First, a common set of variables was identified as 
determinants of poverty that could be estimated from both the household survey and the population 
census. Second, regression equations were estimated from the LSMS survey to find the relationship 
between expenditure poverty and the chosen set of variables. Third, the estimated poverty equations were 
applied to each household in the population census to estimate expenditure poverty by household in the 
population census. Fourth, the household poverty data was aggregated to commune, district and higher 
levels of aggregation as desired. At the second step, around half of the variance in expenditure poverty is 
explained and the estimating error in the most disaggregated final estimates of poverty are quite large. 
Nonetheless, careful presentation and interpretation of these errors in the report give confidence to the 
key results reported. 
The method can also be applied to other countries but is heavily dependent on the close proximity of 
a good household survey and a population census. Similar exercises have recently been undertaken in 
Malawi (IFPRI 2002) and Nepal (Bastola 2003). In general, the construction of ‘poverty maps’, using a 
variety of approaches is widespread. The Povertymap website (www.povertymap.net), which is jointly 
funded by FAO, UNEP and the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), 
currently lists exercises in 23 countries. 
 
8. Fontana (2003) has modified existing SAMS for Bangladesh and Zambia for gender analysis by a 
disaggregation of labour inputs and by including gendered social reproduction and leisure activities as own 
production and consumption in the households. Her innovative study includes gendered poverty impacts 
of trade liberalisation on the import side and for export markets in the North for Zambia and Bangladesh 
which are potentially of great interest for PSIA. Similarly, recent work at Imperial College Wye and IFPRI 
provides a spatial disaggregation of the agricultural sections of the SAMs available for Malawi and 
Zimbabwe (Dorward 2003; Dorward, Morrison, Wobst, Lofgren and Tchale 2004) and that has facilitated 
groundbreaking work on spatial poverty traps using a disaggregated Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) household model of the agricultural sector. By empirically linking the agricultural commodity and 
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labour markets with household and farm characteristics, the new Malawi and Zimbabwe household 
models show, for example, the impact of a decrease in commodity prices that leads to an expansion in the 
output of large farms, a decline in the output of small farms, an expansion of wage labour supplied by 
small farmers (often women), an increase in large farmer income and an increase in poverty of small 
farmers especially women. 
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